Witnesses have the duty to tell the police as much as they know of a crime at the earliest opportunity in order to be seen as witnesses of truth and a Court of law must be careful in accepting delayed evidence when no satisfactory explanation is given.
– Ogunwumiju JCA. Okeke v. State (2016)
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“In any event, section 12(2)(b) of the National Industrial Court Act, 2006 and Order 5 Rule 6 (b) of the Rules of this Court 2017 allows this court to depart from the Evidence Act in the interest of justice, fairness, equity and fair-play. See the case of Mr. Victor Adegboyu V. United Bank for Africa (unreported) Appeal No. CA/IL/20/2021, a decision of the Court of Appeal Ilorin Judicial Division delivered on the 14th day of April, 2022, where the Court of Appeal applied section 12(2) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 and departed from the provisions of the Evidence Act 2011.”
— P.I. Hamman, J. per para. 2.6. FRN v ASUU (2022) – NICN/ABJ/270/2022
Now it is settled law that the evidence of a witness taken in an earlier proceeding is not relevant in a later trial. except for the purpose of discrediting such a witness in cross-examination and for that purpose only.
– Kawu, JSC. Ogunnaike v. Ojayemi (1987)
It is settled that the Court has a duty to act on unchallenged and uncontroverted evidence. See: BRONWEN ENERGY TRADING CO.LTD v OAN OVERSEAS AGENCY (NIG) LTD (2022) LPELR-57307(SC) at page 31, paras. B-C; and OGUNYADE v OSHUNKEYE & ANOR (2007) LPELR-2355(SC) at pages 22 – 23, paras. B F.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023
In Comfort Asaboro v. M.G.D. Aruwaji and Anor. (1974) 4 SC 87 at 90-91 (Reprint) this court had cause to consider the principles which are to be taken into consideration in an application to call additional evidence on appeal. The court per Coker JSC said:- “The decision also evidently applied the principles which time honoured practice has established and the matters which the courts have always taken into consideration in the judicious exercise of powers to grant leave to adduce new evidence, namely:- The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been with reasonable diligence obtained for use at the trial; The evidence should be such as if admitted, it would have an important, not necessarily crucial, effect on the whole case; and the evidence must be such as apparently creditable in the sense that it is capable of being believed and it need not be incontrovertible. See for these observations Roe v. R McGregor and Sons Ltd. (1968) 1 WLR 925 where the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Ladd v. Marshall (1954) 3 All ER 745 was considered and applied. Strictly speaking, under our own rule, the discretion to grant leave to adduce new evidence is properly exercised for the “furtherance of justice”. The exercise must however be judicious and it is in this respect that the guidelines set out above have been followed and applied. We are not unmindful of the fact that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow a person who did not call evidence in the lower court, or who, for one reason or another, had called insufficient evidence at the trial, with comparative ease, to bring forward for the first time before this court the evidence which could and should have been adduced before the trial Judge. Such an attitude would be disastrous to the principles of seeing an end to litigation. The stand taken by the Privy Council in the case of Edie Maud Leeder v. Nnance Ellis (1953) at 52 (sic) also illustrates this point. However one looks at the problem, it seems to be generally accepted that the guiding principles have always been applied to the special facts or circumstances of each application before the Court of Appeal, and in every case the question whether or not sufficient diligence has been put into the quest for such evidence has been decided as a matter of fact.”
Very much aware of the findings of facts by the two lower courts in this matter, I must state, all the same, that where the evidence to be evaluated is mainly documentary as here, this court is as in good a vintage position as the trial court. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
Comet Shipp. Agencies Ltd v. Babbit Ltd (2001) FWLR (Pt. 40) 1630, (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 712) 442, 452 paragraph B, per Galadima JCA (as he then was ) held that: “Companies have no flesh and blood. Their existence is a mere legal abstraction. They must therefore, of necessity, act through their directors, managers and officials. Any official of a company well placed to have personal knowledge of any particular transaction in which a company is engaged can give evidence of such transaction.”
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