The point must be made that, it is the primary duty of a trial Court to make findings of fact on evidence adduced before it and ascribe due probative value to same. It is only when the trial court abdicates its duty or fails to perform it properly that an appellate court can step in to perform such a function. Even then, an appellate court can only do so, if the demeanour of witnesses is not in point.
– Afolabi Fabiyi JCA. Mueller v. Mueller (2005)
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In a trial, there are generally two sets of findings of facts: A finding of fact may be based on the credibility of witnesses or may be informed from other facts proved before the trial court. Where a witness gives direct evidence that is the evidence of the facts in issue as seen, heard or perceived by any other sense by him. (Section 77 of the Evidence Act). The finding of the trial court on such evidence depends on whether or not it believes that witness (credibility of the witness). Such a finding on such evidence is a primary finding of fact, i.e. the way the witness testifies, his demeanor in the box tells much of his credibility. The trial court that saw and heard the witness is in the best position to assess his credibility and make findings of primary facts. But, where on the other hand, other facts are put in evidence from which the facts in issue can be inferred, or where a witness gave circumstantial evidence, the finding of the trial court on the facts in issue depends on inference. This is a secondary finding of fact as it is not based on the credibility of the witness but on logical process of inference. In the former’s case, i.e. primary findings of fact, an appeal court should always be loathe in interfering with such a finding as it did not have the privilege of seeing, hearing or observing the demeanour of the witness. There are several decided authorities on this: Ebba v. Ogodo & Anor (1984) 4 SC 75; Akintola v. Olowa (1962) 1 All NLR 224; Fatoyinbo v. Williams (1956) 1 FSC 87; Egri v. Uperi (1974) 1 NMLR 22; just to mention a few. In the latter’s case, i.e. where findings of fact are secondary, i.e. drawn from inferences, an appeal court is in as good position as a court of trial to do this. It can differ from the trial court. See: Akpopuma V. Nzeka (1983) 2 SCNLR 1.
— T. Muhammad, JSC. VAB Petroleum v. Momah (2013) – SC.99/2004
Tobi, JSC, held that: “Relevant facts are facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction and facts which are the occasion, caused or effect, immediate or otherwise of relevant fact or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they happened or which afforded an opportunity from their occurrence or transaction.” See Abubakar v. Chuks (2007) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1066) 319 at 402 paras G-H.
It has long been established that the function of the evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial Court, Igago v State (1999) LPELR – 1442 (SC) 27; Onuoha V. The State [1998] 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 118. Where the trial Court has unquestionably, evaluated evidence and, justifiably, appraised the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere, and to substitute its own views for the view of the trial Court. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)
Now, a court in the determination of a matter before it enquires into and relies on the relevant facts led by parties before it, draws inferences from such facts and the arguments canvassed by the parties or their counsel. Judicial evidence is the means by which the facts relied upon in taking decisions are proved. Facts are proved by oral testimony of the persons who perceived them, by the production of documents and inspections of things or places. Facts can also be proved by admissions, confessions, judicial notice, presumptions and estoppel. A Judge is free to take Judicial notice of all such facts he is either called upon to or from his general knowledge of such facts or from enquiries made by him on such facts from sources to which it is proper for him to refer.
– M.D. Muhammad, J.C.A. Shona-Jason v Omega Air (2005) – CA/L/418/2000
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.
– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120
A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.
— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006
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