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ENTIRE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE MUST BE READ TOGETHER TO DETERMINE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE

Dictum

The law is settled that in order to discover the real intention of the legislature, the entire provisions of statute must be read together as a whole. No section of a statute should be read and construed in isolation. If the entire provisions of the FIA are read together, it becomes clear that before a request for access to information relating to personal information of an individual in the custody of a public official or public institution can be granted, the applicant must show to the institution or the Court where an applicant approaches the Court for a review of decision of a public institution to deny access to personal information in its custody, the existence of any of the conditions or situations stated under Section 14(2) and (3) of the Act.

— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017

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EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

A-G. of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 NWLR 646. This is that the express mention of one thing in a statutory provision automatically excludes any other which otherwise would have applied by implication, with regard to the same issue.

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PERSON WHO INTERPRETED A STATEMENT MUST TENDER IT IN COURT

It is settled that the person or officer who interpreted a statement must tender it in Court so that if necessary, the interpreter can be cross examined on whether the interpreted statement is the correct interpretation of the original words as spoken by the Defendant.

– H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. State v. Ibrahim (2021) – SC.200/2016

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PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION WHEN LITERAL INTERPRETATION WILL LEAD TO ABSURDITY

Office of Governor, Adamawa State PDP V. INEC (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt. 626) 200 SC, the natural words of the Constitution at the time only allowed for the assumption of office by a Deputy in the event of the Governor’s death and at page 249 in PDP V. INEC (supra), Wali, JSC, very aptly observed as follows: “Where literal interpretation of a word or words used in an enactment will result in an absurdity or injustice, it will be the duty of the Court to consider the enactment as a whole with a view to ascertain whether the language of the enactment is capable of any other fair interpretation, or whether it may not be desirable to put a secondary meaning on such language, or even to adopt a construction which is not quite strictly grammatical Alhaji Atiku Abubakar and Mr. Bonnie Haruna were simultaneously elected as Governor and Deputy Governor of Adamawa State by the electorate of that State. Each must have his own supporters that had voted for him. Each has, therefore, acquired a right by being elected. If the narrow and literal interpretation applied to Section 37(1) of the Decree by the Court of Appeal is adopted, the end result will be that Mr. Bonnie Haruna, through no process of a successful election petition lodged against his election, is being deprived of the mandate given to him by the people of Adamawa State. It is manifest from the fact in this case that principles of justice require that where something is not expressly provided for in an enactment, the Court, in interpreting such enactment, will take into consideration the spirit and meaning of the enactment as a whole and construe it accordingly. To arrive at a just and fair decision, we must bear in mind the provision of Section 45(1) of the Decree, which though not in force at the time this action was instituted, but has adequately provided for a situation as the one at hand, such as resignation, permanent incapacity or removal for any other reason. The act of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar can be likened to permanent incapacity or even death in the given situation. The word “dies” in Section 37(1) of the Decree, in my view, expresses only a more permanent form of incapacity. If comparison of one clause with the rest of the enactment makes certain preposition clear and undoubted, it must be construed accordingly so as to make it a constant and harmonious whole. To adhere to the literal construction put on Section 37(1) of the Decree as done by the Court of Appeal, will lead to manifest injustice being visited on the 2nd Appellant. The word “dies” used in that Section, and having regard to Section 45(1) of the said Decree, needs to be modified to include and cover the situation created by the departure of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, in order to avoid any inconvenience and manifest injustice to the 2nd Appellant. Courts may resort to purposive interpretation if they can find in the Statute read as a whole, or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to interpretation, an expression of legislature’s purpose and policy.”

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WHERE PROVISIONS ARE UNAMBIGUOUS, MUST BE GIVEN ORDINARY MEANING

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION VS. THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER (1999) 9 N.W.L.R. (PART. 618), page 187 wherein IGU, JSC at page 264, paragraph G – H of the report had this to say – : “…And where the words used or the provision of any section the law are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless, of course, this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the law.”

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COURT SHOULD AVOID CONSTRUCTION THAT WILL CAUSE CHAOS

In Okotie Eboh v. Manager (supra) Pats-Acholonu, JSC (of blessed memory) pronounced as follows: ‘An interpretation that seeks to emasculate should be avoided as it would do disservice to the citizenry and confine everyone into a legal container or labyrinth from which this court may not easily extricate itself ——– I believe that though justice is blind, it is nevertheless rooted in the nature of society and therefore the court should avoid constructions that could cause chaos and disenchantment. Justice must be applied in a way that it embraces and optimizes social engineering that is for the welfare of society. Enlightened society should expect a highly refined and civilized justice that reflects the tune of the time.’

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A RETROSPECTIVE OPERATION IS NOT TO BE GIVEN TO A STATUTE UNLESS EXPRESSLY INTENDED

✓ In Re Athlumney (1898) 2 Q.B. 547, Wright J opined thus:-“Perhaps no rule of construction is more firmly established than this, that a retrospective operation is not to be given to a statute so as to impair an existing right or obligation, otherwise than as regards a matter of procedure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment; If the enactment is expressed in a language that is fairly capable of either interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.”

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