The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.
— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013
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The Respondent admitted that he intended to escape when he was been beaten by the police. Investigation by the police does not include beating. Therefore if the respondent intended to escape from such brutality which constituted violation of his fundamental right, he committed no wrong.
— P.A. Galinje, JSC. State v Masiga (2017) – SC
Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.
— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
The position of the law is that for a claim to qualify as falling under fundamental rights, it must be clear that the principal relief sought is for the enforcement or for securing the enforcement of a fundamental right and not, from the nature of the claim, to redress a grievance that is ancillary to the principal relief which itself is not ipso facto a claim for the enforcement of fundamental right. Thus, where the alleged breach of a fundamental right is ancillary or incidental to the substantive claim of the ordinary civil or common law nature, it will be incompetent to constitute the claim as one for the enforcement of a fundamental right: See Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWI.R (Pt. 842) 113, at 180; Tukor v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; and Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR) Pt. 696) 159.
– S.A. Akintan, JSC. Abdulhamid v Akar & Anor. (2006) – S.C. 240/2001
Para. 53: “The rights to life, health and dignity are intertwined such that a violation of one can lead to the violation of the other. It follows that the enjoyment of a healthy life is dependent on the ability to afford good medical services which in turn is dependent on the financial security sufficient for maintenance of good health. Payment of pension implicates the ability of pensioners to enjoy these guarantees. The allegation of the violation of the right to life does not necessarily entail the actual loss of life or merely physical act of breathing, neither does it connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood, right to health and many more. Consequently, the refusal to pay retirement benefits can occasion the violation of the right to health and thus a violation of the right to life. Of course the dignity of a person is implicated if due to lack of means traceable to denial of pension, the person becomes a relic of the society falling from his/her ordinary standard in life with the likelihood of becoming a beggar.”
— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19
It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.
— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013
A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
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