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JUDGES SHOULD RESTRICT COMMENTS TO ONLY ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

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We need to point it out from the onset and there is no disputing this age-long legal position that, no Court has the powers to veer into questions or issues not placed before it. The primary objective of a Court is to confine itself to the hearing and determination in an appeal of issues raised in the grounds of appeal and issues formulated therefrom and in the case of a Court of first instance like the trial Court in the instant matter, only the issues presented by the parties in a suit for the Courts resolution. The Court is therefore legally forbidden from transgressing into issues not presented before it. See the case of: Agbor V. The Polytechnic, Calabar (2009) LPELR 8690 (CA). However, this is not to say that Judges cannot express themselves by way of making passing remarks commonly referred to in legal parlance as obiter dicta. Our Law Reports are replete with comments, opinions or remarks and such expressions that Judges are known to make in the course of the delivery of their decisions, but these remarks and opinions do not usually address the core issues that are central to the determination of the case that the Court was called upon to decide, that is, the ratio decidendi of that case. That is why remarks made by way of obiter dicta are not appealable and if per chance an appeal is lodged against an order dictum, that appeal is necessarily irregular and must be struck out, as not being the decision of the Court in the case.

— O.F. Omoleye JCA. Amaechi V. The Governor of Rivers State & Ors. (CA/PH/342/2015, 8 May 2017)

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THE JUDGE MUST BE OBEDIENT TO THE WILL OF PARLIAMENT

Lord Denning, M.R., in DUPORT STEELS LTD v. SIRS (1980) 1 ALL E.R. 529, where it was said by Lord Scarman in his Speech at p. 551 (on an appeal from Lord Denning’s Lead judgment in that case) that: “But in the field of statute law the Judge must be obedient to the will of Parliament as expressed in its enactments. In this field Parliament makes and unmakes the law, the judge’s duty is to interpret and to apply the law, not to change it to meet the judge’s idea of what justice requires. Interpretation does, of course, imply in the interpreter a power of choice where differing constructions is possible. But our law requires that the judge choose the construction which in his judgment best meets the legislative purpose of the enactment. If the result is unjust but inevitable, the judge may say so and invite Parliament to reconsider the provision. But he must not deny the statute. Unpalatable statute may not be disregarded or rejected, merely because it is unpalatable. Only if a just result can be achieved without violating the legislative purpose of the statute may the judge select the construction which best suits his idea of what justice requires.”

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A JUDGE IS TO EXAMINE CASES BEFORE HIM WITH DUE CARE, AND MAY RAISE ANY DEFECT IN A SUIT

This issue reminds of the dictum of this Court in Sodipo v Lemminkainem OY and Anor[1986] 1 NWLR (pt. 15) 220, According to the Court: “A Judge exists to determine disputes and examine with due care and microscopic senses all matters before him in his pursuit of justice.” This dictum, to my mind, is a complete answer to the criticism by the appellants to the way and manner the learned trial Judge resolved the preliminary objection. In the first place, the question of no “live issue” found in the suit, was not raised by any of the parties in arguing the preliminary objection. A trial Judge, however, is within his rights to properly inform himself of a defect in a suit, either with or without external intervention, because it touches directly on the competence of the suit and hence the jurisdiction to entertain it as such. Thus, the established principle that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, at the instance of either the parties or by the Court suo motu, Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt and Ors. [2012] 1 SC (pt. IV) 45; Odiase v. Agho [1972] 1 All NLR (pt.1) 170; Petrojessica Entreprises Ltd v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd, [1992] 2 NWLR (pt. 244) 675. Where however, the issue of jurisdiction is raised, it should be examined in all ramifications. It should not be compartmentalized and subjected to piecemeal examination and treatment, Oloba v Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (pt. 84) 508. The very many faces of jurisdiction should come under the searchlight and be pronounced upon, notwithstanding that it might not have been brought to the attention of the Court.

— C.C. Nweze, JSC. Uzoho v NCP (SC.141/2007, Friday, May 13, 2022)

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PROCESS FOR REMOVAL OF A CHIEF JUDGE BY A STATE GOVERNOR

It is not difficult to see that for the effective exercise of the powers of removal of a Chief Judge of a State by the Governor and House of Assembly, the first port of call by the Governor on his journey to remove a Chief Judge of the State shall be the National Judicial Council which is equipped with the personnel and resources to investigate the inability of the Chief Judge to discharge the functions of his office the subject of disciplinary action of removal through the Committees of the Council and where the infirmity of the mind or body is involved the services of a medical board to examine and submit appropriate report on the Chief Judge to be affected could also avail the Council in the process of investigation.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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A JUDGE IS A HUMAN BEING

In the course of writing a judgment, a Judge analyses sequence of events as they recur and in the process makes some observations and comments. After all he is a human being who is bound by feelings and to express such feelings is not forbidden, as long as he is careful as not to be swayed by it. In other words, a Judge cannot be put in a straight jacket and expected to be so restricted without the liberty to put his thoughts into writing.

– Mukhtar JSC. Nwankwo v. Ecumenical (2007)

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A JUDGE IS EXPECTED TO BE STRAIGHTFORWARD IN HIS JUDICIAL EXERCISE

A Judge by the nature of his position and professional calling is expected to be straightforward, upright, diligent, consistent and open in whatever he does in court and in any other place of human interaction and human endeavour that he happens to find himself. This is because his character as a Judge is public property. He is the cynosure of the entire adjudication in the court, and like caesar’s wife of Ancient Rome, he is expected to live above board and above suspicion, and he must live above board and above suspicion, if the judicial process should not experience any reverse or suffer any detriment. A Judge should know that by the nature of his judicial functions, he is persistently and consistently on trial for any improper conduct immediately before, during and immediately after the trial of a case. In Bakare v. Apena and others (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 33) 1, Obaseki, JSC said that “a trial Judge ought to know that he is on trial for any improper conduct during the trial of a case before him and immediately thereafter”. By his judicial functions, a Judge is expected to hold the balance in the litigation process and he must be overtly seen as holding the balance evenly.

— Niki Tobi, JCA. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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IT IS THE FUNCTION OF JUDGES TO KEEP THE LAW ALIVE

In Transbridge Co. Ltd. v. Survey International Ltd this court per Eso, JSC pronounced as follows: ‘I believe it is the function of judges to keep the law alive, in motion and to make it progressive for the purposes of arriving at the end of justice, without being inhibited by technicalities, to find every conceivable but accepted way of avoiding narrowness that would spell injustice, short of a judge being a legislator, a judge to my mind, must a possess an aggressive stance in interpreting the law.’

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