It is trite that a Petitioner who alleges non-compliance with Electoral Act has the legal burden to establish such non-compliance and show how the non-compliance substantially affected the result of the election. See: LADOJA v AJIMOBI (2016) LPELR-40658(SC) at page 29, paras. A E; and SHINKAFI V YARI (2016) LPELR-26050(SC) at pages 19 – 20, para. C.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023
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It is now trite law that election petitions are sui generis that is, that they are in class of their own and are governed by different rules. An election petition is by nature a very peculiar proceeding which distinguishes it from an ordinary civil proceeding. See Abubakar v. Yar’adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt 1120) 1. In Nwole v. Iwuagwu (2004) 15 NWLR (Pt 895) 61 the Court, held thus: “The courts have often harped on the need to do substantial justice in most cases without dwelling too much on technicalities … in all election matters, the use of technicalities should be avoided, as technicalities merely help to shut the opponent out. It never resolves basic issues in controversy. Once it is agreed that election petitions are in a class of their own, the handling of the matter too must take a form devoid of legal technicalities that tend to leave the litigants more confused. Boldness of a high degree is required of the electoral tribunal, which must never be seen to shy away from obvious grave allegations.”
— J.S. Abiriyi, JCA. Aregbesola v Omisore (2014) – CA/AK/EPT/GOV/05/237/2014
Whereas the process of compiling a Voters Register is a pre-election matter, the use to which an alleged fundamentally defective Voters Register so compiled is put to in an election which may substantially affect the result of the said election is clearly an issue of non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act, which constitutes a ground for challenging an election in a petition under section 138(l)(b) of the Electoral Act, 2010, as amended.
— W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC. Akeredolu v. Mimiko (2013) – SC. 352/2013
Primarily, the law is well settled that the results declared by INEC (1st Respondent) in an election enjoy a presumption of regularity. In other words, they are prima facie correct. See Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act 2011, recently applied by the Supreme Court in ATUMA V. APC & ORS (2023) LPELR-60352 (SC) where JAURO, JSC held at PP 40-41 as follows: “By virtue of Section 168(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011, presumption of regularity inures in favour of judicial or official acts, including those carried out by INEC. The exact words of the subsection are thus: “When any judicial or official act is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular, it is presumed that formal requisites for its validity were complied with.” See P.D.P. V.I.N.E.C. (2022) 18 NWLR (PT. 1863) 653, UDOM V. UMANA (NO. 1)(2016) 12 NWLR (PT. 1526) 179. Fortunately for the Appellant and 1st Respondent, it is only a presumption, which implies that it is rebuttable. Any person who questions the validity of an act in favour of which there is a presumption of regularity, has a duty to rebut the presumption with cogent and credible evidence. A flimsy or half-hearted rebuttal will not suffice.”
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
The case of Chatjok v. Kato and others is relevant. The appellant was the petitioner at the Election Tribunal. In his petition, the petitioner claimed that the 1st and 2nd respondents were not qualified to contest the chairmanship election of Kachia Local Government council, Kaduna State in that the 1st respondent was still a public servant in the employment of Kaduna state Ministry of Works and Transport while the 2nd respondent was an ex-convict. The 2nd respondent was alleged by the appellant to have been convicted of the offence of house-breaking by Area Court I Zonkwua. During the hearing of the petition, a preliminary objection on point of law was raised on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents that the appellant’s petition did not comply with the requirements of paragraph 5(1) (c) of schedule 5 to Local Government (Basic constitutional and Transitional provisions) Decree No.36 of 1998 and as such the petition was defective and a nullity. Learned counsel to the appellant conceded to the objection and urged the tribunal to exercise its discretion and strike out the petition without costs. The petition was therefore struck out under the provision of paragraph 5(6) of schedule 5 to the Decree. The Court of Appeal held that where an election petition does not state the scores of the candidates as required under paragraph 5(1) (C) of Decree No.36 of 1998, the Election Tribunal has the discretion to strike out the petition. This is more so when the petitioner cannot amend the petition.
I am also of the view that the appeal can be allowed on the main issue of immunity of the governor under the provisions of section 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. The issue can be resolved by a simple question as to whether a person declared and sworn-in as the governor elect can be sued by appropriate party to challenge the declaration. By law the answer must be in the positive. If the said person is said to be immuned under the section the resultant effect is that once a person is declared and sworn – in as governor elect that ends the matter, no one can complain or take any legal action even if the person conducted any gross election malpractice. This will encourage gross wrongful and illegal activities among the parties contesting for the position. This would undoubtedly negate the necessary intendment of our constitution and would destroy the democracy itself. In election petition where the status of the governor is being challenged, as in this, then the said immunity is also questioned. He has no immunity against being sued and consequently he cannot be immuned from being subpoened. It must be made clear that the provisions of section 308 of the Constitution are applicable to ordinary civil proceedings as in the case of Tinubu v. I.M.B. Securities Limited (supra) and criminal proceedings and not in election related matter as in Obih v. Mbakwe (supra) and our present case. In my judgment the appeal is to be allowed on this issue. It is allowed with an order that the matter be remitted for fresh trial by a tribunal of different membership.
— Ja’ Afaru Mika’ilu, J.C.A. AD v. Fayose (2004) – CA/IL/EP/GOV/1/2004
In the instant case, it is fundamental to point out that, from the pleadings, the allegation of non-compliance is generated by the Petitioners. Under Sections 134(1) and 135 of the Electoral Act, the level of proof required for the success of the Petition is doubled. There must be proof of non-compliance and the further proof that the non compliance affected substantially the result of the election. In the face of such an allegation of non-compliance, the court is enjoined by the law not to invalidate an election if it appears that the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of the Electoral Act. All said and done, the Petitioners have the primary burden of proving that there was non-compliance and that the non-compliance affects substantially the result of the election before the burden can shift to the Respondents to establish that there was no substantial non-compliance with the Electoral Act in the conduct of the election.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
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