THE COURT HAS A DUTY TO ACT ON UNCHALLENGED AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE

SETTLED PRINCIPLES WHICH GUIDE THE COURT WHETHER TO ADMIT FRESH EVIDENCE

As rightly submitted by learned counsel for both parties, there are settled principles, which guide the Court in determining whether to grant leave to adduce fresh or further evidence. They are, inter alia, as follows: (a) The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been, with reasonable diligence, obtained for use at the trial, or are matters which have occurred after judgment in the trial Court. (b) In respect of other evidence other than in (a) above, as for instance, in respect of an appeal from a judgment after a hearing on the merits, the Court will admit such fresh evidence only on special grounds. (c) The evidence should be such as if admitted, it would have an important, not necessarily crucial effect on the whole case; and (d) The evidence must be such as apparently credible in the sense that it is capable of being believed and it need not be incontrovertible. See: Asabaro vs Aruwaji (1974) 4 SC (Reprint) 87 @ 90 – 91: Akanbi vs Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) 118@ 137 – 138 H – B: Esangbedo vs The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57 @ 67 A-C.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Williams v Adold/Stamm (2007) – SC.404/2013

COURTS OF LAW DOES NOT FETCH FOR EVIDENCE FOR PARTIES

The Court of Appeal cannot collect evidence from the market overt; for example from the Balogun market, Lagos; Dugbe market, Ibadan; main market, Jos; Central market, Kaduna; Central market (former Gwari market), Minna; Wuse market, Abuja. On the contrary, the Court of Appeal, has to wait for evidence, as the court did, in the court building duly constituted as a court qua adjudicatory body. Courts of law being legal and sacred institutions do not go on a frolic or on a journey to collect inculpatory or exculpatory evidence. On the contrary, they deal only with evidence before them which is procedurally built on arid legalism. For the avoidance of doubt, I am not saying by this judgment that all was well with the conduct of the Presidential Election conducted in 2007. What I am saying is that there was no evidence before the Court of Appeal to dislodge section 146(1) of the Electoral Act.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

PLAINTIFF MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF HIS CASE

In Ngene v. Igbo (2000) 4 NWLR (Pt. 651) 131 at 142, this Court, per Ogundare, JSC said: “A long line of cases beginning with Kodilinye v. Mbanefo Odu (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 336 has laid it down that in a claim for declaration of title the onus is on the plaintiff to prove his case. He must rely on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence – Jules v. Ajani (1980) 5/7 SC 96 except of course where the weakness of the defendant’s case tends to strengthen plaintiff’s case – Nwagbogu v. Ibeziako (1972) Vol. 2 (Pt.1) ECSLR 335, 338 SC or where the defendant’s case supports his case – Akinola v. Oluwo (1962) 1 SCNLR 352 (1962) 1 All NLR 224 (1962) (Pt. 1) All NLR 225 all of which is not the case here.”

EVIDENCE GIVEN IN ANOTHER CASE, HOW MAY BE USED IN PRESENT CASE

Evidence given by a witness in another case may be used to impeach his credit if, in the later case, he says something different; but what he said in the earlier case does not become evidence in the later case. And a judgment given in another case can, in appropriate cases, be put in a later suit, to prevent the re-opening of the same question. One hopes that the indiscriminate introduction of other proceedings into a trial will be discontinued.

— Bairamian, F.J. Owonyin v. Omotosho (1961) – F.S.C.249/1960

EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS vs EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE AT ALL

In Unity Life and Fire Insurance Company Ltd V. International Bank of West Africa (2001) LPELR-3412 (SC) (2001) NWLR (Pt 713) 610 this Court in restating the principle has held at pages 21 22; page 627 of the reports as follows: “A distinction must however, be drawn between where the evidence complained of is one which by law is prima facie admissible albeit under stipulated conditions as against where such evidence is by law inadmissible in any event and in all circumstances. In the latter class of cases, such evidence ought never to be acted upon by any Court of law whether, of first instance or of appeal, and it is immaterial that its admission in evidence was by the default or consent of the party complaining in failing to raise the necessary objection at the appropriate time. In other words, where the evidence complained of is by law inadmissible in any event and all circumstances, the evidence cannot be acted upon by any Court of law even if the party complaining failed to raise any objection or consented to the admission of such evidence in the proceeding. The appellate Court in such circumstance is duty bound to entertain a complaint on the admissibility of such evidence by the trial Court, reject it if it finds it absolutely inadmissible in any event and in all circumstances and decide the case on the legal evidence before the Court…”

THE COURTS LEAN AGAINST CALLING FRESH EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

Before concluding on the said prayer 7 it is helpful to call to mind the observations of Oputa JSC in Obasi v. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61 ) 364, 372 in an application to call additional evidence on appeal: “To talk therefore of assessing the rightness or wrongness of the trial court’s verdict today by evidence that will be given tomorrow is to talk in blank prose. This is the reason why appellate courts are very reluctant to admit “fresh evidence”, “new evidence” or “additional evidence” on appeal except in circumstances where the matter arose ex improviso which no human ingenuity could foresee and it is in the interest of justice that evidence of that fact be led:- R v. Dora Harris (1927) 28 Cox 432. But by and large, at least in criminal cases (and the principle should also be the same in civil cases), the courts lean against hearing fresh evidence on appeal.”

— Oguntade, JSC. UBA v BTL (SC. 301/2003, 15 April 2005)