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THE EFFECT OF BIAS ON A JUDGE

Dictum

On the subject of bias, I make bold to say that the allegation once made is a serious one. This in my opinion is more serious because in this instance, the integrity of the Judge is being attacked. The language of bias is indicative of a deliberate action by the Judge to look outside the law and the facts to decide a matter. Accusing a judicial officer of bias is to say that the judicial officer is not fit to take over the responsibility of such great honour and a direct affront to the oath of office that he took on the day he was sworn in. In fact, a Judge is a representative of God on earth and therefore should imbibe the principle of justice and therefore jealously guide this divine calling. To be a judicial officer takes more than knowledge of the law and been intelligent but must more requires good character in both the strict and general sense of the word. An appeal on grounds of bias is a challenge on the character, the integrity of the judicial officer. It is a challenge that takes away from him the covering of decency as a judicial officer. I am going into all that to drive home the point that lawyers should be very careful in accusing a judicial officer of bias except when there is convincing evidence to buttress that. I make bold to say that the time has come for disciplinary action to be taken against lawyers who accuse a Court or Judge of bias which he can not establish. Once a Court has been accused of bias, unfortunately it cannot be taken back and no matter how clean the judicial officer is, there is a dent on his integrity even if it is by one person who earlier held him in high esteem. – EBIOWEI TOBI, J.C.A. Abdul v. State (2021)

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A CHARGE OF BIAS ON THE JUDGE

A charge of bias arises when a Judge shows an act of partiality, see Akinfe v. The State (1988) 3 NWLR (pt.85) 729. Etymologically, bias means slant, personal inclination or preference; a one-sided inclination. It also means a pre-conceived opinion, a pre-disposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction. Bias creates a condition of mind which sways judgment and renders a Judge unable to exercise his functions impartially in a particular case. There is another expression and it is likelihood of bias. When a party in an action contends that there is likelihood of bias, he is anticipating that the Judge will be biased in the judicial process. The act of bias is not formalised. The act of bias is not concretised, but by the generality of the conduct of the Judge, the possibility of bias is overt. And the possibility is substantial. See generally LPDC v. Chief Fawehinmi (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.7) 300. In a charge of bias, the integrity, honesty or fidelity of purpose and the Judge’s traditional role of holding the balance in the matter are questioned. He is branded or seen as one who leaves his exalted, respected and traditional arena of impartiality to descend unfairly on one of the parties outside all known canons of judicial discretion. The Judge is said to have a particular interest, a proprietory interest which cannot be justified on the scale of justice, as he parades that interest recklessly and parochially in the adjudication process to the detriment of the party he hates and to the obvious advantage of the party he likes. The Judge, at that level, is incapable of rational thinking and therefore rational judgment. His thoughts are blurred against the party he hates. He is poised for a fight, an uninstigated fight in which he is the main participant. The conduct of the Judge invariably and unequivocally points to one trend and it is that he will give judgment to the party he favours at all cost, come day or night, come rain or sunshine. Such is the terrible state of mind of the biased Judge or one who is likely to be biased.

— Niki Tobi, JCA. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS OF A JUDGE IS NOT A STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIR

In the present case therefore which principally involves the procedure for initiating and conducting disciplinary proceedings against a Chief Judge of a State where the National Judicial Council which had been given a role in the appointment and exercise of disciplinary control over judicial officers of the Appellant’s rank under the Constitution, it is not correct as argued by the Respondents that the entire matter in the case was a State Government affair.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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WHAT IS BIAS?

Egwumi v. State (2013) LPELR-20091(SC) 23, A-B per Rhodes-Vivour, J.S.C. defined ‘bias’ as follows: “Bias means anything which tends or may be regarded as tending to cause a Judge to decide a case otherwise than on the evidence.”

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SIGNING OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS BY A JUDGE – FORM 2

It is clear from the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 that nowhere in the body of the Rules is it provided that whenever an originating summons is being taken out it must be signed by a Judge of the High Court to which the originating summons relates. The Rules are silent on such a provision. However, the form of the originating summons which is prescribed in the Appendix to the Rules as Form 2 implies that the originating summons would be signed by a Judge. But nowhere is it provided that it is mandatory for a Judge to sign the originating summons. That notwithstanding, a close examination of Form 2 will reveal that directives are being given to a prospective defendant in an action to do certain things. Some of the directions read as follows – “Let the defendant, within 14 days (or if the summons is to be served out of the jurisdiction, insert here the time for appearance fixed by the order giving leave to issue the summons and serve it out of the jurisdiction) after service of this summons on him, inclusive of the day of service, cause an appearance to be entered to this summons, which is issued on the application of the plaintiff…” “If the defendant does not enter an appearance, such judgment may be given or order made or in relation to him as the court may think just and expedient. The defendant may enter an appearance in person or by a solicitor by handing in the appropriate forms, duly completed, at the Federal High Court at or in the High Court of……..State sitting.” Surely, neither the plaintiff nor his counsel would be expected to issue these directives to the defendant, for the defendant who is at loggerheads with the plaintiff could ignore such directives and to no consequence, since neither the plaintiff nor his counsel could have any power to carryout or enforce the sanctions contained in the directions. It is only a Judge that is conferred with such coercive powers. It, therefore, follows that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, contemplate that an originating summons issued in the form of Form 2 thereof would be signed by a Judge. What would be the effect if any person other than a Judge signs the originating summons need not bother us here in view of what I intend to state anon.

— Uwais, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987

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REAL LIKELIHOOD OF BIAS MUST BE INFERRED BY A REASONABLE PERSON

If it can be reasonably inferred by a reasonable person sitting in court, from the circumstances that there is a real likelihood of bias against one of the parties on the part of the court, it must follow irresistibly that party’s right to a fair hearing had been contravened and the decision on the issue between the parties by the court in such circumstances should not be allowed to stand.

– T. Muhammad, JSC. Womiloju v. Anibire (2010) – SC.211/2002

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COORDINATE JUDGES CANNOT OVERTURN ONE ANOTHER

In NWANI vs. EDE (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 466) 332, Tobi, JCA (as he then was) stated: “It is a general principle of law that a Judge lacks the jurisdiction to overturn the decision of another Judge, even if he feels strongly that the decision is wrong. Such a judicial conduct is tantamount to presiding over the decision of the brother Judge on appeal. The Constitution does not allow such a procedure…”

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