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WHEN A LACUNA IN LAW MEETS WITH THE RIGHT OF A CITIZEN

Dictum

A lacuna is said to exist in law when there is a lack of specific and or general law or a law which is of universal application which can be applied in a matter or situation before the Court. Where there is no specific law but there are existing general laws enacted in respect of similar matters, the general principle is that the general law enacted in respect of similar matters or a law which is of universal application and which has provisions relating to a similar situation before the Court must be applied to resolve the situation. Even, where in very rare cases, there is no existing law regulating or relating to a particular situation brought before the Court, a citizen who has a genuine grievance and has approached the Court for a solution will not be left without a remedy. That is the purport of the Supreme Court’s decision in PDP v. INEC (SUPRA) AT 241 (D-F) where the Court per Uwais JSC held as follows: “For this Court to perform its function under the Constitution effectively and satisfactorily, it must be purposive in its construction of the provisions of the Constitution. Where the Constitution bestows a right on the citizen and does not expressly take away nor provide how the right should be lost or forfeited in the circumstance, we have the duty and indeed the obligation to ensure that the enured right is not lost or denied the citizen by construction that is narrow and not purposive. To this end the established practice of this Court is where the constitutional right in particular, and indeed any right in general, of a citizen is threatened or violated, it is for the Court to be creative in its decisions in order to ensure that it preserves and protects the right by providing remedy for the citizen.”

— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017

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IMPROPER & IRREGULAR EXERCISE OF RIGHTS CONSTITUTES ABUSE

As I have observed, it is not the exercise of the right, per se, but its improper and irregular exercise which constitutes an abuse. Essentially, it is the inconvenience, inequities, involved in the aims and purposes of the application which constitute the abuse. Otherwise, where there is a right to bring an action the state of mind of the person exercising the right cannot affect the validity or propriety of its exercise. The proposition has been aptly expressed by Lord Halsbury in Mayor & City of Bradford v. Pickles (1895) AC at p.594 when he said, “If it was a lawful act, however, ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it. If it was an unlawful act however good his motive might be, he would have no right to do it. Motives and intentions in such a question as is now before your Lordships seem to me absolutely irrelevant.”

— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) – S.C. 250/1991

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DNA TEST AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

Certainly, Appellant cannot be allowed such whimsical past time, as it has no place in law. It is unimaginable for a Court to order two unwilling adults or senior citizens to submit to DNA test, in defiance of their fundamental rights to privacy for the purpose of extracting scientific evidence to assist Appellant to confirm or disprove his wish that the 2nd Defendant – a 57 year old man -is his child, of an illicit amorous relationship! I think Appellant’s claim at the Court below, founded on an obscene and reprehensive immoral foundation, was a scandal and blackmail, which a sound lawyer would be ashamed to associate with … I think it is only the 2nd Respondent (a mature adult) that can waive his rights and/or seek to compel his parents (or those laying claim to him) to submit to DNA test to prove his root. Of course, where one is a minor (not mature adult) and his paternity is in issue, the Court can order the conduct of DNA test, in the overall interest of the child, to ascertain where he belongs. That is not the situation in this case, where Appellant has a duty to establish his claim on the 2nd Respondent, independently, and to produce such evidence to the Court. Of course, if he elects to use the DNA test, to establish his claim it is up to the Appellant to go for it on his own, and/or woo the Respondents to do so, without a resort to the coercive powers of the Court, to compel his adversary to supply him with the possible evidence he needs to prove his case. The law is that, he who asserts must prove!

— I.G. Mbaba, JCA. Anozia v. Nnani & Anor. (2015) – CA/OW/29/2013

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RIGHT VS PRIVILEGE

I hold that when a claim of right metamorphoses into one of supplication, it ceases to wear the clothe of a right but a mere privilege. In this case the appellant was literally begging the respondent for mercies.

– Pats-Acholonu, JSC. ADECENTRO v. OBAFEMI (2005)

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COURT SHOULD PROVIDE REMEDY WHERE THERE IS A RIGHT

Both lower courts agreed that the factual situation in the transaction between the parties reveals a right vested in the appellant. The law is that the court must provide a remedy where the plaintiff has established a right. The court is also to look into the substance of an action and not the form. The appellant is entitled to a remedy and justice.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. BFI v. Bureau PE (2012) – SC.12/2008

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CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

The citizen’s right to remain silent has for long been firmly recognised and established under the common law. In Rice v. Connolly (1966) 2 All E.R. 649 at p.652, the Lord Chief Justice opined: “The whole basis of the common law is the right of the individual to refuse to answer questions put to him by persons in authority and refuse to accompany those in authority to any particular place short of course of arrest.” Today, this right has been expressly preserved under Section 33(11) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979. If, therefore, the appellant was not on trial and an irrelevant question was put to him, even by a judicial authority, it would seem to me that the necessity or obligation to answer such question cannot arise. It is trite that relevancy of facts is of paramount importance in our adjectival law. That paramountcy has been given conspicuous expression in Part II, Sections 3, 6 to 13 and 15 to 18 of the Evidence Act.

– Achike JCA. Adeyemi v. Edigin (1990)

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TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT – GARBA’S CASE

As the students were wrong in going on a rampage, the University Authorities will on their own part be wrong in using means other than those allowed them by law in dealing with the disturbance. Two wrongs, they say, do not make one right. – Oputa, J.S.C. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550

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