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WHETHER AN UNSTAMPED DOCUMENT IS ADMISSIBLE

Dictum

In ETOKHANA v. NDIC & ANOR. (2016) LPELR-CA/K/212/2013, “In addition to this, the law is that a document cannot be rejected on the ground that it was not stamped, for, as held in the case of Prince Will Eyo Asuquo & Ors. V. Mrs. Grace Godfrey Eyo & Anor. (2013) LPELR-20199 (CA) per Tur, JCA, ‘the purpose of the requirement of stamping is to ensure that Government does not lose revenue thereby’. Lack of stamping, His Lordship held, does not render the document inadmissible.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A. (P. 41, Paras. A-C)

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DOCUMENTS MADE WHILE ELECTION IS PENDING – SECTION 83(3) EA; ALSO EXCEPTION

In resolving this issue, it is necessary to have recourse to section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011, provides thus: “Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish” The import of this section, is that before a document could be rejected as inadmissible, it must not only be made when litigation was pending or anticipated, but the person making it must be interested. It is not in dispute, from the dictates of the letters and their annexure updated membership lists, that exhibits P163 and P163(a) were made and dated the 28 th day of April, 2023 and June 9, 2023 and were submitted and received by the 1 st Respondent on the 3 rd day of May, 2023 and 6 th of July 2023 respectively. Both Exhibits P163(b) and 2R20(x), (which as said by this tribunal are the same, as one is an extract of the other), are not dated nor signed. The position of the law generally speaking, in relation to documents prepared in anticipation of impending litigation, is that such documents are not admissible in evidence, although there are exceptions to this general rule. See the cases of ANISU VS OSAYOMI (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 110) PAGE 246 AT 275, ABDULLAHI VS HASHIDU (1999) 4 NWLR (PT. 600) 638 AT 645, ANYANWU VS UZOWUAKA (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1159) 445 AT 476. The exception to this general rule, excludes documents made in anticipation of litigation, by a person who is not personally interested in the outcome of the litigation. The operative words, as far as the exceptions are concerned, are “persons not personally interested in the outcome of the litigation”. In other words, it relates only to a situation, where such a person relying on such documents, has no personal interest in the matter, as against mere interest in an official capacity. In the instant case, the exceptions do not apply here. This is because the maker of exhibit P163, P163(a) and exhibit 2R20X is the 3rd Respondent, who is a party in this Election petition and clearly has exhibited her interest in the ultimate result of the proceedings for the simple reason that the temptation to protect her interest is clearly overwhelming. See the following cases: ALIYU VS ADEWUYI (1996) 4 NWLR (PT. 442) 284, GBADAMOSI VS KANO TRAVELS LTD (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 608) 243, GAMJI NIG. COMP. LTD VS NIG. AGIP OIL. COMP. LTD (2018) LPELR- 49215 (CA).

— A. Osadebay, J. APC v INEC & Ors. (EPT/KN/GOV/01/2023, 20th Day of September, 2023)

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THERE NEED NOT BE REFERENCE TO OTHER DOCUMENT TO CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM

Timmins v. Moreland Street Property Co. Ltd. (1958) Ch. 110 which shows the relaxation of the earlier rules and that there need not be a specific or express reference from one document to the other document in order to constitute a memorandum required under the Statute of Frauds as is sufficient if by necessary implication there should be reference from one to the other. Jenkins L.J., (as he then was), said at page 130: “The rule has no doubt been considerably relaxed since Peirce v. Corf LR. 9 QB. 210 was decided in 1874, but I think it is still indispensably necessary, in order to justify the reading of documents together for this purpose, that there should be a document signed by the party to be charged, which, while not containing in itself all the necessary ingredients of the required memorandum, does contain some reference, express or implied, to some other document or transaction. Where any such reference can be spelt out of a document so signed, then parol evidence may be given to identify the other document referred to, or, as the case may be, to explain the other transaction, and to identify any document relating to it. If by this process a document is brought to light which contains in writing all the terms of the bargain so far as not contained in the document signed by the party to be charged, then the two documents can be read together so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum for the purpose of Section 40.”

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DOCUMENTS ARE ALLOWED TO SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES

In my view this is the best starting point because words in a document are allowed to speak for themselves and unless a statement will lead to ambiguity or absurdity words are to be interpreted and understood based on their ordinary grammatical con or meaning.

– A.A.B. Gumel, JCA. Alechenu v. AG Benue (2011) – CA/J/220/2002

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DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WEIGHS ORAL TESTIMONY

The Documentary evidence lends weight to oral testimony. It serves as an action from which oral testimony is weighed for good measure. – Nwodo, JCA. OLAM v. Intercontinental Bank (2009)

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EXCEPTION TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE BEING TENDERED BY THE MAKER

The general rule as to who can tender documentary evidence is that documentary evidence should be tendered through its maker. This is because the maker of such documents can validly answer the questions put forward with regards to the documents so his attendance may be necessary to facilitate cross-examination. See Section 91 of the Evidence Act 2011. See also the cases of Statoil Nig. Ltd v. Inducon Nig. Ltd [2014] 9 NWLR (Pt 1411) (P. 94, Paras, A-B). It is not however, at all times that documentary evidence must be tendered by the maker, as the person to whom it is made can also produce it in Court. If it can be shown to the Court by the person seeking to tender same that the maker of the document is dead or unfit by reason of his body or mental condition; that the presence of the maker of the document may also be excused if he is overseas or if it is not reasonably practicable to call him to tender the document in view of attendant expense.

— O. Oyewumi, J. Aseidu v Japaul (2019) – NICN/AK/01/2016

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FAIR HEARING NOT BREACHED WHEN A DOCUMENT IS EXPUNGED BY TRIAL JUDGE

I have seen in recent times counsel forcing into cases the principles of fair hearing even when they are so distant from the case. The principles of fair hearing will not be invoked in favour of a party where the trial Judge correctly expunges an exhibit earlier admitted. It is only when the document is wrongly or wrongfully expunged from the record that a party can be heard to canvass to an appellate court that he was denied fair hearing. – Niki Tobi, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)

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