This is because, in my respectful view, it is settled that a transaction created by a deed will not come into effect prior to the delivery of the deed. In other words, a deed only becomes effective upon its delivery. So, until the time specified had arrived or the condition had been performed or the Governor has given his consent, the instrument, will not be a deed so to speak, but is a mere escrow.
– Ogbuagu, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)
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It is settled that the deposit of title deeds with a bank as security for a loan, creates an equitable mortgage as against legal mortgage which is created by deed transferring the legal estate to the mortgagee. – Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
Kadiri v. Olusaga (1956) 1 FSC at p. 178: “It is the case, as stated by the learned trial Judge, that the security given was not the form of a legal mortgage, that is to say by deed, transferring the legal estate to the respondent, but the deposit of title deeds as security for a loan is an equitable mortgage, and I am unable to agree that the loan was an unsecured one within the meaning of the legislation in question. As Lord Macnaghten said when delivering the judgment of the Board in Bank of New South Wales v. O’Connor (1889) 14 AC page 273. ‘It is a well established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without either writing or word of mouth will create in equity a charge upon the property to which the document relates to the extent of the interest of the person who makes the deposit. In the absence of consent that charge can only be displaced by actual payment of the amount secured.'”
I think Professor Kasunmu, S.A.N. counsel for the appellant was right when he submitted that the Court of Appeal relied on the recital to the deed to control the operative clause in Exhibit A. It is well settled that in interpreting a deed, an unambiguous operative part cannot be controlled by the recital. The clear and unambiguous operative part must be given full expression and effect. See I.R.C. v. Raphael (1935) A.C. 96,135 Dawes v. Tredwell (1881) 18 Ch. D. 354,388-9.
— Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Adebanjo v Olowosoga (1988) – SC 134/1986
The fact that the Deed of Lease was registered is not evidence of its delivery – see Jules V Ajani (1980) 5 S.C. 96. A.S.H.D.C. v Emekwue (1996) – SC. 282/1989
I think Professor Kasunmu S.A.N., counsel for the appellant was right when he submitted that the Court of Appeal relied on the recital to the deed to control the operative clause in Exhibit A. It is well settled that in interpreting a deed, an unambiguous operative part cannot be controlled by the recital. The clear and unambiguous operative part must be given full expression and effect. See IRC v. Raphael (1935) AC 96, 135 Dawes v. Tredwell (1881) 18 Ch.D 354, 388-9.
— A.G. Karibi-Whyte, JSC. Olowosago V. Adebanjo (SC.134/86, 29 Sep 1988)
It is now settled that a mere deposit of title deeds as security for a loan constitutes an equitable charge over the land or property.
– Oguntade JSC. Yaro v. Arewa CL (2007)
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