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APPEAL FROM CUSTOMARY COURT OF APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEAL MUST RELATE TO CUSTOMARY QUESTION

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Pam vs. Gwom (2000) FWLR 9Pt.1) 1 at 12 that: “The right of appeal from the Customary Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal is as of right and must relate to any question of Customary Law and/or such other matters as may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly that can extend this right by providing for such matters. Neither the Federal Military Government nor the National Assembly, made such other provision as envisaged in Section 224(1) of the 1979 Constitution. In the circumstances, for an appeal from the Customary Court of Appeal to the Court of Appeal to be competent, it must raise a question of Customary Law.”
Ayoola JSC: “The question therefore is: when is a decision in respect of a question of Customary Law? I venture to think that a decision is in respect of Customary Law when the controversy involves a determination of what the relevant Customary Law is and the application of the customary Law so ascertained to the question in controversy… When the decision of the Customary Court of Appeal turns purely on facts, or a question of procedure, such decision is not with respect to a question of Customary Law, not withstanding that the applicable law is Customary Law.”

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CUSTOM CAN BE PROVED BY A SINGLE WITNESS

In the cited case of Usiobaifo v. Usiobaifo (2005) 3 NWLR (Pt. 913) 665 Tobi JSC at pp. 683 – 684 paragraphs H D clarified the position thus – “The main crux of this appeal is whether the respondents proved the Ishan Customary Law of inheritance. The appellants submitted that they did not. The respondents submitted that they did prove the customary law. It is the argument of the appellants that a person other than the party asserting the custom should testify in proof or in support thereof. Although learned counsel cited Ozolua II v. Ekpenga and Oyediran v. Alebiosu (supra), it is my humble view that proof of customary law is not one of the areas in our adjectival law that need corroboration. While it could be desirable that a person other than the person asserting the Customary Law should testify in support of the customary law, it is not a desideratum. This is because the Evidence Act does not so provide. And here, Section 14(1) provides the anchor. The subsection merely provides that a custom ‘can be proved to exist by evidence.’ And evidence can be led on the existence of the custom by a single witness or more witnesses. It is not my understanding of the law that a village or community of witnesses must be called to satisfy the provision of Section 14(1). In the evidential scene in the context of probative value, it is not the number of witnesses that matter but the quality of the evidence given. And so, a situation may arise where a single witness gives credible evidence while a number of witnesses may not because they are a bundle of contradictions. Therefore emphasis should be on quality of the evidence given rather than the quantity.” (Underlining supplied for emphasis)

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PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGED CHILD WILL SHARE IN ESTATE

Alake v. Pratt (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 20, to the effect that if paternity of children is acknowledged by a man during his lifetime they are to be regarded as legitimate and entitled to share in his estate with his children born of a marriage contracted under the Marriage Ordinance.

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DOCTRINE OF REPUGNANCY TO FINE TUNE CUSTOMARY LAW

As our society advances, they are more removed from its pristine social ecology. They meet situations which were inconceivable at the time they took root. The doctrine of repugnancy in my view affords the courts the opportunity for fine tuning customary laws to meet changed social conditions where necessary, more especially as there is no forum for repealing or amending customary laws. I do not intend to be understood as holding that the Courts are there to enact customary laws. When however customary law is confronted by a novel situation, the courts have to consider its applicability under existing social environment.

– Nwokedi JSC. Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989

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CUSTOMARY LAW IS A QUESTION OF FACT TO BE PROVED

It is well settled that customary law is a question of fact to be proved by evidence. See Section 14 of Evidence Law. Hence a party who alleges the existence of a particular custom must adduce sufficient evidence in support and to establish its existence to the satisfaction of the court. See Inyang v Ita (1929) 9 NLR 84. But there comes a time when by frequent litigation in the courts, a point of customary law has been sufficiently ruled upon, the courts will no longer require proof, and would be prepared to take judicial notice of it. See Angu v Attah, PC 74, 28, 43; Buraimo v Gbamgboye (1940) 15 NLR 139; Giwa v Erimolokun (1961) 1 All NLR 294, 1 SCNLR 337. The burden is on the defendants to establish the custom they rely upon for their defence. Balogun v Labiran (1988) 3 NWLR (Part 80) 66. Indeed only a single decision, sufficiently cogent and authoritative would be sufficient – Larinde v Afiko (1940) 6 WACA 108, but see Cole v Akinyele (1960) 5 FSC 84; (1960) SCNLR 192; Folami & others v Cole & others (1990) 2 NWLR (Part 133) 445.

– Karibe-Whyte JSC. Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989

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CUSTOMARY LAW IS PART OF NIGERIAN LAWS WHEN PROVED

The cases cited by learned Counsel for the parties namely Esugbayi Eleko v Officer Administrating the Government of Nigeria; In Re Whyte; Cole v Cole; Nwokoro v Onuma; Buhar of Kaligeri v Bornu Native Authority; Laoye v Oyetunde, deal with elementary principles of our customary law jurisprudence to wit that customary laws are part of the body of laws to be applied by the Court, the application of customary laws subject to the doctrine of repugnance, the essential ingredients of proof and incidents of customary laws.

– Nwokedi JSC. Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989

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A STATUTE WILL NOT APPLY TO CUSTOMARY LAW

Distinguishing these cases from the instant case, the Court of Appeal correctly held that the marriage between P.W.1 and the appellant was shown to be under native law and custom. In further distinguishing the cases, the Court of Appeal referred to the facts. In Rimmer v. Rimmer (supra) both husband and wife were wage earners. They bought a house in the name of the husband as the matrimonial home. The wife provided the deposit for the house. The rest of the purchase money was borrowed on the security of a mortgage from a building society in the name of the husband. Part of the principal of the mortgage money was repaid out of the housekeeping money provided by the husband. The remainder was repaid by the wife out of her money at a time her husband was on war service. The wife provided all the furniture for the home out of her own resources. When subsequently, the husband left the wife and the house was sold, the proceeds was shared equally between them on a summons under section 17 of the Married Women’s Property Act 1881 (U.K.). This was because it was not possible fairly to assess the separate beneficial interests of the husband and wife by reference to their contributions to the purchase of the house. In the instant case, the Married Womens’ Property Act 1881 (U.K.) is inapplicable since the marriage is governed by customary law.

– Karibe-Whyte JSC. Amadi v. Nwosu (1992)

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