All that has now changed in this country for section 72(1) of CAMA makes it possible for a pre-incorporation contract to be ratified by a company after its incorporation and thereby becoming bound by it and entitled to the benefit thereof. There seems to be no dispute in this appeal about this conclusion.
— Ogundare, JSC. Societe Favouriser v. Societe Generale (1997) – SC.126/1994
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A company is a legal person with legal capacity to sue or be sued. That legal personality and capacity continues until the company dies a legal death in the process, and as a result of winding up and dissolution.
– Oputa, JSC. Intercontractors v. National Provident (1988)
One of the occasions when the veil of incorporation will be lifted is when the Company is liable for fraud as in the instant case. – Galadima JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)
It is now a settled principle of company law that a company is not bound by a preincorporation contract being a contract entered into by parties when it was not in existence. No one can contract as agent of such a proposed company there being no principal in existence to bind. It is also settled that after incorporation a company cannot ratify such a contract purported to be made on its behalf before incorporation … But there is nothing preventing the company after incorporation from entering into a new contract to put into effect the terms of the preincorporation contract. This new contract can be in express terms or can be implied from the acts of the company after incorporation as well as from the minutes of its general meetings and board meetings.
— Nnamani, JSC. Edokpolo v. Sem-Edo & Ors. (1984) – SC.89/1983
It is not necessary that it is only that person who carried out the function on behalf of the company that must testify. Not at all, as any official of the company well equipped with the transaction and or related documents would suffice to testify. – Peter-Odili JSC. Chemiron v. Stabilini (2018)
Jenkins, L.J. in Edwards Vs Halliwell (1950) 2 ALL ER 1084 @ 1066, where His Lordship held inter alia: “The rule in Foss Vs Harbottle, as I understand it, comes to no more than this. First, the proper plaintiff in an action in respect of a wrong alleged to be done to a company or association of persons is prima facie the company or the association of persons itself. Secondly, where the alleged wrong is a transaction which might be made binding on the company or association and or all its members by a simple majority of the members, no individual member of the company is allowed to maintain an action in respect of that matter for the simple reason that if a mere majority of the company or association is in favour of what has been done, then cadit quaestio. Thus, the company or association is the proper plaintiff in all actions in respect of injuries done to it. No individual will be allowed to bring actions in respect of acts done to the company which could be ratified by a simple majority of its members. Hence the rule does not apply where the act complained of was ultra vires the company, or illegal or constituted a fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers are in the majority and in control of the company.”
On this appeal, it was argued by counsel on behalf of the respondent that even though it may be a legal entity in its country of incorporation, it had no artificial personality in Nigeria since the Companies Act is silent on whether a company such as the appellant would be allowed to sue or not. That submission is misconceived. The principle of law that a foreign corporation, duly created according to the laws of a foreign state recognized by Nigeria, may sue or be sued in its corporate name in our courts is part of the common law. The suggestion that a foreign company duly incorporated outside Nigeria should first be registered in Nigeria under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1968 (which was then the applicable statute) dealing with registration of foreign companies, notwithstanding that it does not fall into the category of foreign company” as defined by that Act, is too preposterous and patently inimical to international trade to merit any prolonged or serious consideration. It suffices to say that the appellant company which was admitted by the respondent to be a limited liability company with its registered office in Copenhagen properly sued in its corporate name.
— Ayoola, JSC. Saeby v. Olaogun (1999) – SC.261/1993
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