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COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF A NULLIFIED JUDGEMENT NOT PRODUCED BEFORE IT

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Whether the record and contents of a nullified judgment ought formally be produced in court or extract thereof be placed before the court before the opinions expressed therein could be countenanced; or whether the Court of Appeal could have taken notice of their existence and contents by the mere fact that the nullified judgment was probably in the archives of the court. In Attorney-General v. Silem L.R. 10 H.L. Cas. 704, it was held that S.26 of the Queens Remembrance Act, 1859, which empowered the Barons of Exchequer to frame rules for making “the process, practice and mode of pleading” on the revenue side of the court uniform with that of the plea side, did not give the Judges the power of entertaining appeals on revenue cases, as they assumed. It is always necessary to exercise powers conferred by an enabling statute within the four comers of the statute: see Australian cases of Tavcar v. Tavcar (1950) A.L.R. 260; White v. White (1947) A.L.R. 342. It therefore appears to me that the power, conferred by S.73(1) of the Evidence Act, for a court to take judicial notice of its course of proceedings and rules of practice cannot rightly be invoked to take judicial notice of the contents of a nullified judgment, which the members had not earlier had an opportunity of seeing. For, true, it existed as a fact, being devoid of any legal consequences, it was then like any other opinion, say, in a textbook. I do not think that anybody can suggest that such a textbook opinion should be judicially noticed.

— P. Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Gbaniyi Osafile v. Paul Odi (SC 149/1987, 4th day of May 1990)

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TRIAL COURT HAS POWER TO ENFORCE ITS OWN JUDGEMENT

The judgment subsists and remains binding on the parties until set aside; and it took immediate effect from the date it was pronounced. Section 287(3) of the Constitution enjoins the said trial Court to enforce its own judgment.

— Ejembi Eko, JSC. Oboh & Anor v. NFL (SC.841/2016, January 28, 2022)

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WHAT IS A FINAL JUDGEMENT

A judgment of court which finally settles the rights of the parties in the subject matter of the claim in the sense that it was not given in default of a Statement of Defence is a final judgment.

– Karibi-Whyte, JSC. Afegbai v. A.G Edo State (2001)

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ONCE A COURT DELIVERS JUDGEMENT IT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO; EXCEPTIONS THAT EXISTS

It is settled law that once a Court has delivered its decision on a matter, it becomes functus officio with regard to that matter. What this means is that a Court cannot sit as an appellate Court over its decision; once it has decided a matter, it ceases to be seized of it, and it cannot re-open it for any purpose whatsoever – see Ogboru V. Ibori (2005) 13 NWLR (Pt. 942) 319 Sun Insurance V. LMBS Ltd. (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt 940) 608, Ukachukwu V. Uba (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt 956) 1, Ubeng V. Usua (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt 994) 244 and Onyekweli V. INEC (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt 1136) 13. But the law also says that Courts of record have the inherent jurisdiction to set aside their Judgments/decision/order, in appropriate cases. When a. The Judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the Court or of one or more of the Parties; b The Judgment is a nullity; c. It is obvious that the Court was misled into giving Judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it; d. The Judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction; e. The proceedings adopted was such as to deprive the decision or Judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication; or f. Where there is fundamental irregularity. See Alao V. ACB (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt 672) 264, Tomtec (Nig.) Ltd. V. FHA. (2009) 16 NWLR (Pt 1173) 358 SC, and Jev V. lyortom (supra).

— A.A. Augie, JCA. Elias v Ecobank (2016) – CA/L/873/2013

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JUDGEMENT IN REM

In Oni & Anor V Oyebanji & Ors( SC/CV/398/2023 on 6-4-2023) this court Per Agim JSC restated the law on this concept thusly “As this Court held in Ogboru & Anor v. Uduaghan & Ors (2011) LPELR-8236 (SC) “A judgement in rem may be defined as the judgement of a court of competent jurisdiction determining the status of a person or thing as distinct from the particular interest of a party to the litigation. Apart from the application of the term to persons, it must affect the “res” in the way of condemnation, forfeiture, declaration, status or title. (a) Examples are judgment of a Court over a will creating the status of administration. (b) Judgment in a divorce by a Court of competent jurisdiction dissolving a marriage declaring the nullity or affirming its existence. (c) Judgment in an election petition. The feature of a judgment in rem is that it binds all persons – 36 whether a party to the proceedings or not. It stops anyone from raising the issue of the status of persons or persons or things, or the rights or title to properly litigated before a competent Court. It is indeed conclusive against the entire world in whatever it settles as to status of the person or property. All persons whether party to the proceedings or not are stopped from averring that the status of persons is other than the Court has by such judgement declared or made it to be.” Okpalugo vs. Adeshoye (t996) 10 NELR pt. 476, pg. 77, Fan trades Ltd. vs Uni Association Co. Ltd. (2002) 8 NWLR Pt. 770, pg. 699., Ogbahon vs. Reg. Trustees CCCG (2002) 1 NWLR Pt. 749, pg. 675, Olaniyan vs Fatoki (2003) 13 NWLR pt. 837, Pg. 273.

— E.A. Agim, JSC. Oyetola v INEC & Ors. (2022) – SC/CV/508/2023

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SOME PRINCIPLES ON THE NATURE OF A COURT’S JUDGMENT

1. A judgment or ruling of a competent court ought not to be illusory, but ought to have its consequences. One consequence of the Order of the Court of Appeal dated 13/11/85 is the restoration of Chief Ojukwu to his residence at No. 29 Queen’s Drive. The applicants by their delaying tactics have so far made that order illusory.

2. A judgment once given should be accepted as correct until the contrary is proved. This can only be done by and in an appropriate higher Court of Appeal – in this case the Supreme Court. This Court has not yet over-ruled or set aside the Order of the Court of Appeal of 13/11/85.

3. He who is in defiant disobedience of the law – here an Order of court – cannot appeal to the same law to help him continue in his disobedience.

4. The Applicants in this Motion are asking the court to exercise its discretion in their favour. The exercise of discretion is equitable and the function of equity is to supplement the law never to counteract or contradict the law.

– Oputa, JSC. Military Governor v. Ojukwu (1986) – SC.241/1985

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JUDICIAL NOTICE: MATTERS SO NOTORIOUS, AND MATTERS WHERE COURT MEMORY NEEDS TO BE REFRESHED

✓ It seems to me from a view of all the decided cases that matters which can be judicially noticed fall into two broad classes. First: There are those which are so notorious that the court automatically takes notice of them, once it is invited to do so. Secondly: There are others which, although judicially noticeable, the court will not do so until something is produced, though not formally tendered as evidence, in order to inform the court or refresh its memory on the matter before it notices it. Thus the court may be invited to, and does, inform itself as to a date (Tutton v. Darke (1860) 5 H & N 649; for a publication in a Gazette by the production of the Gazette (Ogbunyiya v. Okudo (supra). On this broad division of judicial notice, the courts have usually refused to take notice of matters falling within the second category when the material from which it can inform itself or refresh its memory is not produced by the party inviting it to take notice of the particular matter. In Omeron v. Dowick (1809)2 Camp. 44, Lord Ellenborough declined to take judicial notice of the King’s proclamation because counsel failed or neglected to produce a copy of the Gazette in which it was published. In R. v. Holt (1793) 5 T.R. 446 the court held that articles of war of which it ws invited to take notice ought to have been produced. Also in Pilkington v. Cooke, 16 M & W. 615, the court refused to take judicial notice of when an order of the Judges, allowing a scale of fees to be taken by the sheriffs, was made. It appears to me from the decisions in the above cases that the courts will take notice without more of cases falling within the first category of matters that could be judicially noted, above; but will, in the case of the second insist on the appropriate material from which it can inform itself or refresh its memory being produced. I believe that the underlining assumption is that cases of the first category are matters of knowledge of which the Judge knows or is expected to know. He is not expected to know or remember off hand matters falling within the second category. But because of their very nature, the court can be informed of them or his memory be refreshed thereon; without the matter requiring to be proved by evidence. — P. Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Gbaniyi Osafile v. Paul Odi (SC 149/1987, 4th day of May 1990)

✓ The point that I need to emphasize at this stage is that our law preserves the distinction between those facts of which the court shall take judicial notice, when called upon by a party to do so, because those facts are notorious to him, on the one hand, and those facts which, in exercise of its powers under subsection (3) of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, he may, when called upon to take judicial notice of the fact, refuse to do so unless and until such a person produces the necessary material or he has informed himself properly to enable him to do so. When the former is the case, the Judge, once called upon to take judicial notice of the fact, proceeds to do so based on his general knowledge, memory and experience. In the latter case, a proper foundation must be laid for him to take notice of the fact. The only difference is that under section 73(2), even for matters falling within the first category he may resort for his aid to appropriate books or other documents or reference. — P. Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Gbaniyi Osafile v. Paul Odi (SC 149/1987, 4th day of May 1990)

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