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COURT OF LAW WILL NOT ENFORCE AN ILLEGAL CONTRACT OR ALLOW ITSELF TO BE USED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FRAUD

Dictum

As at 1981 when he commenced negotiation to purchase the land, he held no title, customary or statutory which he could validly pass to the respondent. Any agreement reached between the appellant and the respondent which enabled the latter to hold the legal estate in the land for the benefit of the appellant would be unenforceable since the appellant could not pass any title to the respondent. A Court should not enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract or transaction which is illegal provided the illegality is brought to the notice of the Court and the person invoking the aid of the Court is himself implicated in the illegality. The illegality disclosed here is the attempt by the appellant to circumvent the provisions of the Land Use Act and this is against public policy and a contract may be against public policy either from the nature of the acts to be performed or from the nature of the consideration. Where a transaction is on the face of it, or from the facts adduced in evidence or the surrounding circumstances, apparently illegal, the Court must act to enforce and protect the law of the land. See: Sodipo v. Lemminkainen OY (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 8) 547.

— K.B. Aka’ahs, JSC. Huebner v Aeronautical Ind. Eng. (2017) – SC.198/2006

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PARTY LIABLE OF A FUNDAMENTAL TERM WILL NOT BE GRANTED RELIEF IN EXCLUSION CLAUSES

It is settled from a number of decisions that a party in breach of a fundamental term of his contract with a third party will not be allowed to benefit from or resort to exclusion clauses: PINNOCK BROTHERS v. LEWIS & PEAT LTD (1956) 2 ALL E.R. 866; ADEL BOSHALLI v. ALLIED COMMERCIAL EXPORTERS LTD (1961) ALL NLR 917 at 922; OWNERS OF NV GONGOLA HOPE v. S.C. (NIG). LTD. The rationale for the principle is that a party who is guilty of breach of a fundamental term of contract could/should not benefit from his own wrong doing by resorting to exclusionary clauses in order to limit his liability. This is moreso, when a contract of carriage by air is brazenly breached and no explanation is offered, as in the instant case. In which case there is a total failure of consideration and the central purpose or essence of the contract has wholly disappeared.

– Ejembi Eko, J.S.C. Mekwunye v. Emirates (2018) – SC.488/2014

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COURT CANNOT IMPOSE CONTRACT ON A PARTIES

The relationship between the parties in this case is well-scripted, known and appreciated by them. The Court cannot write or rewrite any agreement for the parties. The parties to any transaction usually have their positions which they bring to their table of negotiation. When they are done with their negotiations, they now have their terms well-crafted to govern the transaction they enter into. The parties and no other are responsible for their terms of engagement. No Court has the power to script or foist on the parties terms which are strange to their agreement. Parties are bound by the terms of their contract.

— S.J. Adah, JCA. Luck Guard v. Adariku (2022) – CA/A/1061/2020

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NATURE OF A BREACH OF CONTRACT

It is clear to me that a contract between parties may be discharged by breach of a fundamental term by any of the parties. There is no gain-saying the point that a breach of contract is committed when a party to the contract without lawful excuse fails, neglects or refuses to perform an obligation he undertook in the contract or incapacitates himself from performing same or in a way back down from carrying out a material term. See: Adeoti & Anr. v. Ayofinde & Anr. (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.709) 336 … Where a party to a contract is in breach of a material term of same, the breach gives the aggrieved party a lee-way or an excuse for non-performance of its own side of the bargain. Such a party is at liberty to treat the contract as extinguished or at an end. See: Yadis (Nig.) Ltd. v. G.N.I.C. Ltd. (2007) 14 NWLR (Pt.1055) 584 at 609.

— Fabiyi, JSC. Best Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (2011) – SC

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THE ILLEGAL PART OF A CONTRACT CAN BE SEVERED FROM THE OTHER LEGAL PART

This is because it is a recognized principle of law that a contract will rarely be totally illegal or void: certain parts may be entirely lawful in themselves, while others are valid. Where the illegal or void parts can be “severed” from the rest of the contract on the well-known principles of severance such will be done and the rest of the contract enforced without the void part. It is permissible for courts to adopt this course where the objectionable part of the contract involves merely a void step or promise and is not fundamental, and it is possible to simply strike down the offending part without re-writing or remaking the contract for the parties and without altering the scope and intention of the agreement; and lastly, the contract, shorn of the offending parts, retains the characteristics of a valid contract. See on these Vol. 9 Hals. Laws of England (4th Edn.) p.297 in paragraph 430. See also Commercial Plastics Ltd. v. Vincent (1964) 3 All E.R. 546, C.A.

— Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Adesanya v Otuewu (1993) – SC.217/1989

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PARTIES BOUND BY CONTRACTUAL TERMS IN ABSENCE OF FRAUD

The well laid down position of the law is that Courts do not rewrite contact for the parties where the terms of the contract are clear. In the absence of fraud, duress and undue influence, misrepresentation, the parties are bound by their contract. It is only parties to a contract that can sue and be sued on it.

– Rhodes-Vivour JSC. Alade v. Alic (2010)

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CONTRACT OF SERVICE AT COMMON LAW VS IN STATUTORY FLAVOUR

It is important to recognise the distinction between a contract of personal service and a contract of service. There is also the distinction between a contract of service at common law, and a contract with statutory favour. Whereas at common law a contract of personal service is determinable by the master at will without cause a contract of service is determinable by the master on reasonable notice or on the notice stipulated in the contract of the parties. A strict compliance with the statutory requirements for determination is required in contracts re-enforced by Statute or created by statute.

— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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