In awarding damages in an action founded on breach of contract, the rule to be applied is restitutio in integrum that is, in so far as the damages are not too remote, the plaintiff shall be restored as far as money can do it, to the position in which he would have been if the breach had not occurred.
– ADEKEYE, J.S.C. Cameroon v. Otutuizu (2011) – SC.217/2004
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The law is settled that an appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with an award of damages made by a trial Court unless it is shown that in the assessment and award of damages, the trial Court applied a wrong principle of law or misapprehended the facts or that the award is so high or so low.
— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017
The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him or a possible secondary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting that harm. The rationale behind the compensatory theory for the award of damages is found in the maxim restitutio in integrum. In other words, to restore the injured party to the position he or she was in prior to the injury.
– Kekere-Ekun JSC. British v. Atoyebi (2014) – SC.332/2010
The appellant’s learned senior counsel had submitted that it had shown reasons for this Court to interfere with the award of damages. An appellate Court does not usually interfere with award of damages unless: (a) the trial Court acted under a mistake of law; or (b) where the trial Court acted in disregard of some principles of law: or (c) where the trial Court acted under misapprehension of facts; or (d) where it has taken into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant matters; or (e) where injustice would result if the appellate Court does not interfere; or (f) where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or high that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages, see SPDCN v. Tiebo VII (supra); Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (supra); British Airways v. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 253; Agu v. General Oil Ltd. (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1488) 327.
— O.F. Ogbuinya JCA. Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. Longterm Global Cap. Ltd. & Ors. (September 20 2021, ca/l/1093/2017)
It is no longer a matter for contention that the principle in regard to the assessment and award of special damages is different from that of general damages: see Ijebu-Ode Local Govemment v.Adedeji Balogun & Co (1991) 1NWLR(Pt.166) 136 at p. 158; Eseigbe v.Agholor (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.316) 128 at p. 145. In the former, damages are specially pleaded, strictly proved and accordingly awarded; in the latter, they are averred, if necessary under specific heads of claim, presumed in law to be the direct and natural consequence of the act complained of and awarded at large as a jury question.
— Uwaifo, JSC. Rockonoh v. NTP (2001) – SC.71/1995
An award of damages is within the discretionary powers of the court. An appellate court would not usually interfere with a previous award unless satisfied (a) that the trial court acted under a mistake of law; or (b) where the trial court acted in disregard of some principle of law; or (c) where it acted under a misapprehension of facts; or (d) where it has taken into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant matters; or (e) where injustice would result if the appellate court does not interfere; or (f) where the amount awarded is either ridiculously low or ridiculously high that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.
– Kekere-Ekun JSC. British v. Atoyebi (2014) – SC.332/2010
It is trite and well settled as rightly argued by the said counsel that:- the person claiming should establish his entitlement to that type of damages by credible evidence of such a character as would suggest that he indeed is entitled to an award under that head… See the cases of Oladehin v. Continental ile Mills Ltd (1978) NSCC, page 88 and also Imana v. Robinson (1979) NSCC page 1.
— C.B. Ogunbiyi, JSC. Ibrahim v. Obaje (2017) – SC.60/2006
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