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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS OF A JUDGE IS NOT A STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIR

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In the present case therefore which principally involves the procedure for initiating and conducting disciplinary proceedings against a Chief Judge of a State where the National Judicial Council which had been given a role in the appointment and exercise of disciplinary control over judicial officers of the Appellant’s rank under the Constitution, it is not correct as argued by the Respondents that the entire matter in the case was a State Government affair.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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JUDGES SHOULD RESTRICT COMMENTS TO ONLY ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

We need to point it out from the onset and there is no disputing this age-long legal position that, no Court has the powers to veer into questions or issues not placed before it. The primary objective of a Court is to confine itself to the hearing and determination in an appeal of issues raised in the grounds of appeal and issues formulated therefrom and in the case of a Court of first instance like the trial Court in the instant matter, only the issues presented by the parties in a suit for the Courts resolution. The Court is therefore legally forbidden from transgressing into issues not presented before it. See the case of: Agbor V. The Polytechnic, Calabar (2009) LPELR 8690 (CA). However, this is not to say that Judges cannot express themselves by way of making passing remarks commonly referred to in legal parlance as obiter dicta. Our Law Reports are replete with comments, opinions or remarks and such expressions that Judges are known to make in the course of the delivery of their decisions, but these remarks and opinions do not usually address the core issues that are central to the determination of the case that the Court was called upon to decide, that is, the ratio decidendi of that case. That is why remarks made by way of obiter dicta are not appealable and if per chance an appeal is lodged against an order dictum, that appeal is necessarily irregular and must be struck out, as not being the decision of the Court in the case.

— O.F. Omoleye JCA. Amaechi V. The Governor of Rivers State & Ors. (CA/PH/342/2015, 8 May 2017)

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SIGNING OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS BY A JUDGE – FORM 2

It is clear from the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 that nowhere in the body of the Rules is it provided that whenever an originating summons is being taken out it must be signed by a Judge of the High Court to which the originating summons relates. The Rules are silent on such a provision. However, the form of the originating summons which is prescribed in the Appendix to the Rules as Form 2 implies that the originating summons would be signed by a Judge. But nowhere is it provided that it is mandatory for a Judge to sign the originating summons. That notwithstanding, a close examination of Form 2 will reveal that directives are being given to a prospective defendant in an action to do certain things. Some of the directions read as follows – “Let the defendant, within 14 days (or if the summons is to be served out of the jurisdiction, insert here the time for appearance fixed by the order giving leave to issue the summons and serve it out of the jurisdiction) after service of this summons on him, inclusive of the day of service, cause an appearance to be entered to this summons, which is issued on the application of the plaintiff…” “If the defendant does not enter an appearance, such judgment may be given or order made or in relation to him as the court may think just and expedient. The defendant may enter an appearance in person or by a solicitor by handing in the appropriate forms, duly completed, at the Federal High Court at or in the High Court of……..State sitting.” Surely, neither the plaintiff nor his counsel would be expected to issue these directives to the defendant, for the defendant who is at loggerheads with the plaintiff could ignore such directives and to no consequence, since neither the plaintiff nor his counsel could have any power to carryout or enforce the sanctions contained in the directions. It is only a Judge that is conferred with such coercive powers. It, therefore, follows that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, contemplate that an originating summons issued in the form of Form 2 thereof would be signed by a Judge. What would be the effect if any person other than a Judge signs the originating summons need not bother us here in view of what I intend to state anon.

— Uwais, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987

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A JUDGE SHOULD BE SOBER

It has always been my considered view that sobriety should be the first watch-word for anyone who, per chance, finds himself in the exalted position of a judge. A judicial officer should not be talkative or loquacious. Indeed, he should not be boisterous. He should be polite to witnesses and lawyers who appear before him. Above all, a judge should not be biased under any guise. It needs no further gain-saying that Auta J. should watch his steps in the discharge of his judicial functions. My Learned brother has said it all. I also allow the appeal and abide by all consequential orders including that relating to costs in the lead judgment.

— John Afolabi Fabiyi, JSC. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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COORDINATE JUDGES CANNOT OVERTURN ONE ANOTHER

In NWANI vs. EDE (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 466) 332, Tobi, JCA (as he then was) stated: “It is a general principle of law that a Judge lacks the jurisdiction to overturn the decision of another Judge, even if he feels strongly that the decision is wrong. Such a judicial conduct is tantamount to presiding over the decision of the brother Judge on appeal. The Constitution does not allow such a procedure…”

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NIGERIAN JUDGES AND POLITICIANS MUST NOT BE FOUND MINGLING

I see from Exhibit EP2/34 the need for Nigerian Judges to maintain a very big distance from politics and politicians. Our Constitution forbids any mingling. As Judges, we must obey the Constitution. The two professions do not meet and will never meet at all in our democracy in the discharge of their functions. While politics as a profession is fully and totally based on partiality, most of the time, judgeship as a profession is fully and totally based on impartiality, the opposite of partiality. Bias is the trade mark of politicians. Non-bias is the trade mark of the Judge. That again creates a scenario of superlatives in the realm of opposites. Therefore the expressions, “politician” and “Judge” are opposites, so to say, in their functional contents as above; though not in their ordinary dictionary meaning. Their waters never meet in the same way Rivers Niger and Benue meet at the confluence near Lokoja. If they meet, the victim will be democracy most of the time. And that will be bad for sovereign Nigeria. And so Judges should, on no account, dance to the music played by politicians because that will completely destroy their role as independent umpires in the judicial process. Let no Judge flirt with politicians in the performance of their constitutional adjudicatory functions. When I say this, I must also say that I have nothing against politicians. They are our brothers and sisters in our homes. One can hardly find in any Nigerian community or family without them. There cannot be democracy without them and we need democracy; not despotism, oligarchy and totalitarianism. They are jolly good fellows. The only point I am making is that their professional tools are different from ours and the Nigerian Judge should know this before he finds himself or falls into a mirage where he cannot retrace his steps to administer justice. That type of misfortune can fall on him if the National Judicial Council gets annoyed of his conduct. Ours are not theirs. Theirs are not ours. I will not say more. I will not say less too. So be it.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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A JUDGE IS EXPECTED TO BE STRAIGHTFORWARD IN HIS JUDICIAL EXERCISE

A Judge by the nature of his position and professional calling is expected to be straightforward, upright, diligent, consistent and open in whatever he does in court and in any other place of human interaction and human endeavour that he happens to find himself. This is because his character as a Judge is public property. He is the cynosure of the entire adjudication in the court, and like caesar’s wife of Ancient Rome, he is expected to live above board and above suspicion, and he must live above board and above suspicion, if the judicial process should not experience any reverse or suffer any detriment. A Judge should know that by the nature of his judicial functions, he is persistently and consistently on trial for any improper conduct immediately before, during and immediately after the trial of a case. In Bakare v. Apena and others (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 33) 1, Obaseki, JSC said that “a trial Judge ought to know that he is on trial for any improper conduct during the trial of a case before him and immediately thereafter”. By his judicial functions, a Judge is expected to hold the balance in the litigation process and he must be overtly seen as holding the balance evenly.

— Niki Tobi, JCA. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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