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DISTINCTION BETWEEN A HOLDER & OCCUPIER IN LAND LAW

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The essential distinction which could be made between a “holder” and an “Occupier” as defined, is that whereas the former is a person entitled in law to a right of occupancy, the latter is not a person so entitled. The legal effect of the distinction is that an “occupier” will necessarily hold of a “holder” who would at the commencement of the Land Use Act be entitled to a customary right of occupancy. Hence, the fact that the “occupier” is in possession, and the “holder” is not, does not alter the true legal status of the parties.

– Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987

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LAND AND THE QUIC QUID PLANTATUR SOLO SOLO CEDIT

Let me add to the vexed definitions of land the Roman maxim which found its way into the English common Law quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit (whatever is affixed to the soil, belongs to the soil) while the judicial and academic conflict of opinion rages whether that maxim of English Common law is also a rule of Nigerian customary law. While that debate subsists, the better view on the authorities of Santeng v. Darkwa 6 WACA 52 and Moore v. Jones 7 NLR 84 appears that it is not. Be that as it may, it must be borne in mind that this maxim is not an immutable rule of law because a lot depends on the fixture attached to the ground or building. See Adeniji v. Ogunbiyi 1965 NMLR 395. The above definitions of land, including the maxim in respect thereto, show the increasing difficulty in determining the legal conception of land, and the final word in this regard. No doubt, even to the laymen today, land no longer means the ordinary ground with its subsoil, but surely includes buildings and trees growing thereon. for the court in any circumstance, therefore, to exclude the structures and objects, like buildings and trees standing on the ground in the connotation of the term “land” it must be shown to be clearly discernible from the content of the executed or written document.

— Achike, JSC. Unilife v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 609

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OWNER OF LAND UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW REQUIRES CONSENT OF GOVERNOR TO ALIENATE

Land is still held under customary tenure even though dominium is in the Governor. The most pervasive effect of the Land use Act is the diminution of the plenitude of the powers of the holders of land. The character in which they hold remain substantially the same. Thus an owner at customary law remains owners all the same even though he no longer is the ultimate owner. The owner of land, now requires the consent of the Governor to alienate interests which hitherto he could do without such consent.

— Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Ogunola v. Eiyekole (1990) – SC.195/1987

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COURT JURISDICTION IN CUSTOMARY RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY GRANTED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Olaleye-Ote & Anor v. Babalola (2012) LPELR-9275(SC), where it was stated that, “The Land Use Act vested jurisdiction in proceedings relating to Customary Right of Occupancy granted by a Local Government on: ‘An Area Court or Customary Court or other Court of equivalent jurisdiction in a State without classification. The State Law imposed classification with jurisdiction of each grade of Court based on the value or annual rental value of the land, this modifying the jurisdiction conferred by the Federal Law.’ In my humble view, the Federal Legislature effectively covered the field in relation to the jurisdiction of the relevant Courts over proceedings in matters of customary right of occupancy granted by a Local Government. The State Law conferring jurisdiction according to Grade and value of the land in litigation is in conflict with S.41 of the Land Use Act, a Federal legislation.”

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RENT INCLUDE THE IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON THE PREMISES

✓ Ponsford v. H.M.S. Aerosols (supra). Here there was lease dated August 19, 1968 of factory premises in Barking for 21 years and the revision of rent was to be referred to a surveyor under an arbitration clause where the parties disagree on the revised rent. In 1969, the premises were burnt down and rebuilt out of the proceeds of insurance. The licence for the improvements which were in fact made was contained in a document dated November 14, 1969, where in clause 1 it provided: “The landlords hereby grant unto the tenants licence to execute in and upon the demised premises the several alterations and works indicated in the plan annexed …. It is hereby agreed and declared that all the lessee’s covenants and conditions contained in the lease which are now applicable to the premises demised thereby shall continue to be applicable to the same when and as altered and shall extend to all additions which may be made thereto in the course of such alterations.” The lease of August 19, 1968 indicated, inter alia, that the rent would be assessed “as reasonable rent for the demised premises”. The trial judge. held that a reasonable rent for the premises should be assessed without taking account of the improvements made by the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the judge was wrong in his construction of the rent review clause. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, by a majority of 2:1, reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that the revised rent would include the improvements made on the demised premises.

✓ Cuff v. J. & F. Stone Proper Ltd. (supra) provided that improvement on the land should not be wholly disregarded. Cuffs case is different from the case before us in the sense that the improvements on the land had been made prior to the execution of the lease. Accordingly the improvement, unless expressly excluded, must be taken into account in computing the revised rent. In the instant case there was not improvement on the bare land at the time of the lease, and the subsequent improvement did not form part of the demised premises. Without doubt, the improvements in the Cuff case formed part of the demised premises.

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MEANING OF “ANY PERSON” AS USED IN SECTION 36(1) OF LAND USE ACT MEANS ANY NIGERIAN

It is my firm view therefore that the words “ANY PERSON” under section 36(1) of the Act refer to and mean ANY NIGERIAN. The Act has not abrogated any law which limits the rights of aliens to own property. I will however share the views of Omololu-Thomas, J.C.A. that any foreigner who has validly owned or occupied any land before the act is deemed to be an occupier under the act. This however must be in conformity with the definition of occupier under section 50 of the Land Use Act.

— Olatawura, JSC. Ogunola v. Eiyekole (1990) – SC.195/1987

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PLAINTIFF SHOULD ESTABLISH CLEARLY THE AREA OF LAND WHICH HIS CLAIM RELATES

I think it is an elementary requirement of our land law that the first duty of any plaintiff claiming from the court a declaration of title to land is to show clearly the area of land to which his claim relates:- Akinola Baruwa v. Ogunshola (1938) 4 W.A.C.A. 195. This duty a plaintiff can discharge, either by describing the land with such particularity that a surveyor can from his description produce an accurate plan of the land:- Kwadzo v. Adjei (1944) 10 W.A.C.A. 274 or, by himself producing an accurate plan of the land showing precise boundaries. If the plan is inaccurate in the sense that the boundaries are imprecise or that the oral evidence does not tally with the details appearing on the plan, then the trial court will be justified in regarding such a plan as vague and unsatisfactory and again justified in refusing to find a declaration of title on such a plan: Udekwe Amata v. Udogu Modekwe and Ors. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 580. The reason for insisting on accurate plans is simply to enable the parties and other persons claiming through them to know precisely the area of land to which the judgment and orders relate:- Maberi v. Alade (1987) 2 N.W.L.R. (Part 55) 101 at p.106. Enforcement of a judgment and order of injunction based on an inaccurate plan will create difficulties, untold difficulties. Where parties own land abutting a common boundary that common boundary will be shown with particularity and precision: Okorie and Ors. v. Udom and Ors. (1960) 5 F.S.C. 162 at p.166; Udofia & anor. v. Afia and ors. Andy v. Akpabio and ors. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 216. Another feature of our land law which has to be kept in view while considering Issue No. 1 above is that where a party claims a specific area of land and can only prove title to a part of that area of land or where the defendant concedes part of the land claimed, the court can grant the plaintiff title to the area proved or conceded but if; and only if, that area is definite and can be easily hatched out of and excised from the total area claimed, see Abudu Karimu v. Daniel Fajube (1968) N.M.L.R. 151 and Anukwua and ors. v. Ohia and ors. (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 40) 150 at p.161. Otherwise the declaration may be rightly refused.

– Oputa JSC. OLUFOSOYE v. OLORUNFEMI (1989)

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