Generally, where parties to an agreement have set out the terms thereof in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary from, or contradict the terms of the written instrument.
– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)
Generally, where parties to an agreement have set out the terms thereof in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary from, or contradict the terms of the written instrument.
– Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)
SHARE ON
Thus, mere possession of a Power of Attorney does not tantamount to valid title to the land. I am not discounting the fact that the said Exhibit P1 was registered as No. 3 on Page 3 in Volume 221 of the Lands Registry in Awka. However, the registration of a document does not confer any legitimacy or validity to it if it had no power to convey anything ab initio. See Akpene v. Barclays Bank (1977) NSCC (Vol. II) 29 at 36; Rockonoh Property v. Nitel (2001) 7 SCNJ 225 at 248-250.
— H.M. Ogunwumiju JCA. Osakwe V. Nwokedi & Anor. (CA/E/168/2014, 13 July 2018)
Abubakar v. INEC [2020] 12 NWLR (Pt. 1737) 37 @ p. 110: “Before I conclude on this issue, let me state that whenever documents are tendered from the Bar in election matters, the purport is to speed up the trial in view of time limitation in election matters. Such tendering is not the end itself but a means to an end. The makers of such tendered document must be called to speak to those documents and be crossexamined on the authenticity of the documents. The law is trite that a party who did not make a document is not competent to give evidence on it. It is also the tested position of the law that where the maker of the document is not called to testify, the document would not be accorded probative value by the Court. That in deed is the fate of exhibits P80 and P24… Finally, on this issue, it was contended by the appellants that the variation in the names of 2nd respondent on Exhibits R19 and R21 makes his relationship with the two documents doubtful. Is “Mohammed” and “Muhammadu” the same name and belong to the 2nd respondent? The Court below made an elaborate discussion on the issue and concluded that RW5 gave explanation on the names and stated that they are the same…. For me, as the appellants failed to prove that any of the documents belong to another person and as nobody has come out to claim any of the two exhibits, I do agree with the explanation given by the RW5 and the conclusions of the Court below that both names “Mohammed” and “Muhammadu” as contained in exhibits R19 and R21 belong to the 2nd respondent. On this note, I resolve issues one and two against the appellants.”
The law is well settled that where the evidence given by a party to any proceedings was not challenged by the opposite party who had the opportunity to do so, it is always open to the court seised of the case to act on such unchallenged evidence before it. See Isaac Omoregbe v. Daniel Lawani (1980) 3 – 4 SC 108 at 117, Odulaja v. Haddad (1973) 11 SC 357, Nigerian Maritime Services Ltd. v. Alhaji Bello Afolabi (1978) 2 SC 79 at 81, Abel Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters Ltd. (1961) 2 SCNLR 322, (1961) All NLR 917.
— Iguh, JSC. Olohunde v. Adeyoju (2000) – SC.15/1995
In the case of Lafia Local Government –V- Executive Governor Nasarawa State & Ors (2012) LPELR – 2060, OLABODE RHODES VIVOUR, JSC at page 23 paras, E-F said: “Evaluation of evidence entails the trial judge examining all evidence before him before making his findings. This is done by putting all the evidence on an imaginary scale to see which side appears outweighs the other.”
It is settled law that evidence given in a previous case cannot be accepted as evidence in a subsequent proceedings except in conditions where the provisions of section 34(1) of the Evidence Act applies. Even where a witness who testified in a previous proceeding testifies again in a subsequent proceeding, the previous evidence has no greater value than its use in cross-examination of the witness as to his credit. Romaine v. Romaine (1972) 4 NWLR (Part 238) 650 at 669; Ayinde v. Salawu (1989) 3 NWLR (Part 109) 297 at 315; Alade v. Aborishade (1960) 5 FSC 167; Irenye v. Opune (1985) 2 NWLR (Part 5) 1 at 6-8 Sanyaolu v. Coker (1983) 1 SCNLR 168.
— F.F. Tabai JSC. Tijani Dada v Jacob Bankole (2008) – S.C. 40/2003
It is pertinent to note that a signature on a document identifies the document as an act of a particular person and without a signature, the document cannot pass as the act of such unnamed person, and it is therefore totally useless. See N.N.P.C. V. ROVEN SHIPING LTD (2019) 9 NWLR (prt.1676) 67 at 83 and TSALIBAWA V. HABIBA (1991)2 NWLR (prt 174) 461.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry