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FAILURE TO TENDER STOLEN ITEMS DOES NOT MAKE PROSECUTION’S CASE WEAK

Dictum

The position of the law is that where there is overwhelming evidence from Witnesses, which is not contradicted, and which is believed, that property or money were stolen during an armed robbery operation, the non-tendering of these items in Court, as Exhibits, will not destroy the Prosecution’s case – see Ajumobi v. State (2018) LPELR-(43854) SC, wherein Akaahs, JSC, observed that – The production of the stolen items, no doubt, will make watertight the case of the Prosecution. The law, however, still remains that where the evidence adduced by the Prosecution is capable of being believed and the trial Judge believed it and convicts the Accused, an appellate Court will be slow to overturn the verdict simply on the basis that the trial Court could have viewed such evidence otherwise. Where it is suggested that a piece of evidence casts some doubt on the Prosecution’s case, it is necessary to show, unless such is manifest or evident from the Records, what aspects becomes doubtful by reason of the evidence.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. Usman v The State (2019) – SC.228/2016

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RESPONSIBILITY OF TRIAL COURT TO EVALUATE EVIDENCE

It is now settled law, that it is the primary responsibility of the trial court which saw and heard witnesses to evaluate the evidence and pronounce on their credibility or probative value and not the appellate court which neither heard the witnesses nor saw them to observe their demeanors in the witness box. It follows therefore that when a trial court unquestionably evaluates the evidence and appraises the facts of a case, it is not the business of the appellate court to substitute its own views for the views of the trial court. – Musdapher JSC. Gbadamosi v. Dairo (2007)

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SPECIAL DAMAGES WILL BE UPHELD UPON EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND NOT CHALLENGED

On special damages, it has been held that where the plaintiff plead the special damages and gives necessary particulars and adduce some evidence of it without the defendant challenging or contradicting the evidence, he has discharged the onus of proof placed on him and unless the evidence adduced is of such a quality that no reasonable tribunal can accept, it ought to be accepted. The reason is that where evidence called by the plaintiff in a civil case is neither challenged nor contradicted, his onus of proof is discharged on a minimal of proof.

– ARIWOOLA J.S.C. Union Bank v. Chimaeze (2014)

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AVERMENTS IN PLEADINGS VERSUS AVERMENTS IN AFFIDAVIT; ADDRESS OF COUNSEL NOT EVIDENCE

Averments of facts in pleadings must however be distinguished from facts deposed to in an affidavit in support of an application before a court. Whereas the former, unless admitted, constitute no evidence, the latter are by law evidence upon which a court of law may in appropriate cases act. The Court of Appeal, if I may say with the utmost respect, appeared to be under the erroneous impression that an averment in pleadings is synonymous with a deposition in an affidavit in support of an application. This is clearly not the case. So too, an address of Counsel in moving an application is not the evidence in support of such an application. The evidence is the deposition contained in the affidavit in support thereof.

— Iguh JSC. Magnusson v. Koiki (1993) – SC.119/1991

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PRINCIPLES WHICH APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

And that takes me to the principles which an Appellate Court should consider in the evaluation of evidence by the trial Judge: 1. Evaluation of trial evidence is the primary responsibility of the trial court and so an Appellate Court cannot interfere just for the asking by an appellant. 2. An Appellate Court will however evaluate the evidence before the court if the trial court fails to do so; and this is from the Record. 3. An Appellate Court will also evaluate the evidence before the court if the trial court failed to evaluate the evidence properly in the sense that the evaluation is perverse. And so, the evaluation of evidence, though the primary responsibility of the trial court, is not the exclusive preserve of that court. It becomes so only where the evaluation is borne out from the evidence before the court.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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MEANING OF JUDGEMENT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

A castigation of a decision on the premise that a judgment is against the weight of evidence, invariably couched as an omnibus ground, connotes that the decision of the trial Court cannot be supported by the weight of evidence advanced by the successful party which the Court either wrongly accepted or that the inference it drew or conclusion it reached, based on the accepted evidence, is unjustifiable in law. Also, it implies that there is no evidence, which if accepted, will buttress the finding of the trial Court. Furthermore, it denotes that when the evidence adduced by the complaining appellant is weighed against that given by the respondent, the judgment rendered to the respondent is against the totality of the evidence placed before the trial Court. In ascertaining the weight of evidence, the trial Court is enjoined, by law, to consider whether the evidence is admissible, relevant, credible, conclusive or more probable than that given by the other party, see Mogaji v. Odofin (1978) 3 SC 91; Anyaoke v. Adi (1986) 2 NSCC, Vol. 17, 799 at 806/(1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 31) 731; Nwokidu v. Okanu (supra) (2010)3 NWLR (Pt. 1181)362; Akinlagun v. Oshoboja (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 60; Gov. Lagos State v. Adeyiga (2012) 5 NWLR (Pt. 1293) 291; Oyewole v. Akande (2009) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1163) 11; Agala v. Okusin (2010) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1202) 412.

— O.F. Ogbuinya, JCA. Impact Solutions v. International Breweries (2018) – CA/AK/122/2016

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WHERE ORAL EVIDENCE IN PRIOR TRIAL MAY BE USED

Ariku v. Ajiwogbo (1962) All NLR (Pt. 4) 630, Ademola CJF (of blessed memory) delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court stated the law as follows:- “This court has frequently directed attention to the practice, now not uncommon of making use of evidence of a witness in another case as if it were evidence in the case on trial. As was pointed out in Alade v. Aborishade (1960) 5 FSC 167 at 171, this is only permissible under section 33 or 34 of the Evidence Act. Where a witness in a former case is giving evidence in a case in hand, his former evidence may be brought up in cross-examination to discredit him if he was lying, but evidence used for this purpose does not become evidence in the case in hand for any other purpose. There are also prerequisites to the making use of the former testimony of a witness; for example his attention must be called to the former case where such evidence was given and he would be reminded of what he had said on the occasion.”

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