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APPEAL ON FINDING OF FACT REQUIRES LEAVE OF COURT

Dictum

The above finding complained of being a finding of fact, it is settled law that for the appellants to successfully appeal against the finding, they must first of all obtain the leave of either the lower court or of this court. It would have been otherwise if the complaint was purely a complaint of error in law. It is clear from the record that appellants never obtained the leave of either the lower court or of this court to appeal on the facts so ground 1 of the grounds of appeal in so far as it is a complaint against the findings of facts is incompetent and is consequently liable to be struck out.

– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)

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A COMPLAINT IS CHARACTERISED BY THE CASE FACTS SUBMITTED – (African Court)

The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on what qualifies as a complaint is defined as the purpose or legal basis of the claim, The complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on.

– CHACHA v. THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (003/2012) [2014] AFCHPR 48 para 120

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FINDINGS OF FACT WILL NOT BE ORDINARILY DISTURBED

In per Nimpar, JCA. Adepoju v. State (2014) LPELR-23312(CA) “An Appellate Court would not readily interfere with findings of facts by a trial Court except it is perverse and evident on the record”.

In ODOFIN V AYOOLA (1984) LPELR 2227 (SC): “Where a Court of trial which saw and heard witnesses has come to specific findings of facts on the evidence in issues before it, an appellant Court which had no similar opportunity should refrain from coming to different finding, unless it can show that the conclusion of the trial Court was perverse, or that the conclusion would not follow from the evidence before it”.

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WHEN FINDING OF FACT IS SAID TO BE PERVERSE

A finding of fact is said to be perverse – (a) Where it runs counter to the evidence and pleadings. (b) Where it has been shown that the trial court took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into account. (c) Where the trial court shuts its eyes to the obvious. (d) When the decision has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. State v. Agie (2000) 11 NWLR pt. 678 pg. 434 Atolagbe v. Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR pt.2 pg. 360 Adimora v. Ajufo (1988) 3 NWLR pt. 80 pg.1. Akinloye v. Eyiyola (1968) NWLR 92.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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MEANING OF A PERVERSE FINDING

A perverse finding is a wrong, unreasonable or unacceptable finding, having due regard to the evidence before the court. A perverse finding is one not supported by the evidence before the court. It is a finding raised on a wrong assessment of the evidence before the court. A finding of fact based on exaggerated or bloated evidence on the part of the trial court could be perverse. So too finding of fact borne out from addition or subtraction from the evidence before the court.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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WRONGFUL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION MUST BE SHOWED FOR COURT TO INTERFERE IN FINDING OF FACT

On the other side which is that of the respondents is that this Court should affirm the Ruling of the Court of Appeal and dismiss the appeal as frivolous and unmeritorious. This appeal throws up very interesting facets as one is mindful of the fact that an appellate Court will not easily interfere with the exercise of discretion by a lower Court such as presented in the case in hand. To interfere, this Court has to be satisfied from the showing of materials that a wrongful exercise of that discretion has been made such as where the Court below acted under a misconception of the law or under a misapplication of fact such that it is seen that the lower Court gave weight to irrelevant or unproved matters or it omitted to take into account issues that are relevant or where it exercised or failed to exercise the discretion on wrong or insufficient materials and so it behoves the appellate Court the duty in the interest of justice to disturb that earlier decision. I rely on Enekebe v Enekebe (1964) 1 All NLR 102 at 106; Demuren v Asuni (1967) All NLR 94 at 101; Mobil Oil v Federal Board of Inland Revenue (1977) 3 SC 97 at 141; Sonekan v Smith (1967) 1 All NLR 329; Solanke v Ajibola (1968)1 ALL NLR 46 at 52.

— M.P. Odili, JSC. County Dev. Co. v Hon. Min. Env. Housing Urban Dev. (2019) – SC.239/2011

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EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE; INTERFERENCE BY APPELLATE COURT

It has long been established that the function of the evaluation of evidence is essentially that of the trial Court, Igago v State (1999) LPELR – 1442 (SC) 27; Onuoha V. The State [1998] 5 NWLR (pt. 548) 118. Where the trial Court has unquestionably, evaluated evidence and, justifiably, appraised the facts, it is not the business of an appellate Court to interfere, and to substitute its own views for the view of the trial Court. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

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