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FREE AND VOLUNTARY CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT CAN GROUND A CONVICTION

Dictum

In the case of Udo v State (2016) 12 NWLR (Pt.1525) pp.33-34, paras. H-A, this Court held that: “Free and voluntary confessional statement of an accused alone is sufficient to sustain his conviction, provided the Court is satisfied that it was made in a free atmosphere and is direct, unequivocal and positively proved. In this case, the two statements made by the appellant as Exhibits 4 and 5 were confessional. They were sufficient to convict the appellant thereon. Consequently, the defence of alibi raised by the accused during his testimony was too late in the day and only an afterthought”.

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ADMISSIBILITY OF A CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

Olalekan v. State (2001) LPELR-2561(SC) 4, 50-51, F-A, where Onu, J.S.C. held as follows: “This Court has held times without number that the statement of an accused is not inadmissible merely because it is taken down in a different language from the language of the person making it. See Queen v. Baba Haske (1961) 1 All NLR 330 at 333.” (Emphasis supplied).

At page 37, A-C of the same Report, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. also stated as follows: “The general proposition is well settled that where an interpreter has been used in the recording of a statement, the statement is inadmissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down.”

Again, at pages 55-57 of the same Report, Uwaifo, J.S.C. made his findings in extension as follows: “I have read the reasons given by my learned brother Ogundare, J.S.C. for dismissing this appeal on 20 September, 2001. I wish however, to express my views briefly on whether Exhibit A was properly admitted at the trial. Sgt Linus Patricks (PW6) was the officer who recorded the statement of the appellant. The appellant spoke in Yoruba language and PW6, acting through an interpreter, Aremu Adeosun (PE3), recorded the statement in English language. That was how Exhibit A, the said statement, came into existence. Now, PW3 testified that he interpreted between PW6 and the Appellant. Thereafter, he read the statement as written in English language by interpreting it to the Appellant who agreed that it was correctly recorded. He said the Appellant thumb-printed Exhibit A and he, the interpreter, signed it, as did PW6, the recorder of the statement… At the trial Court, no objection was taken to the voluntariness of the statement, or any other objection at all… The objection now taken in this Court is that the statement (Exhibit A) is hearsay evidence… With the greatest respect, what I understand the authorities in this country to establish is that where an interpreter has been used in taking down a statement, both the person who wrote down the statement and the person who interpreted it must be called as witnesses. In the case of the person who recorded the statement, he would, of course, state in evidence the procedure he took in the process. That was done in the present case. As for the person who interpreted, he would need to be presented as a witness to testify that he interpreted. It is then open to the defence to cross-examine them… I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution called the necessary witnesses who gave sufficient evidence in the present case to make Exhibit A admissible… The objection that it was hearsay is not well founded and I overrule it.”

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RETRACTED CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT IS STILL ADMISSIBLE

In ASIMI V. STATE (2016) LPELR – 40436 (SC), this Court per Rhodes Vivour JSC at Pp 14-15, para E-C stated succinctly thus: 22 “Once, an extra-judicial confession has been proved as in this case to have been made voluntarily and it is positive and unequivocal, amounting to an admission of guilt (such as the appellant’s confessional statement, Exhibit P6) a Court can convict on it even if the appellant retracted or resiled from it at trial. Such an afterthought does not make the confession inadmissible. It is desirable but not mandatory that there is general corroboration of the important incidents and not that retracted confession should be corroborated in each material particular.”

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DENIAL OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT DOES NOT MAKE THE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE

Against this background, it is important to note that the Appellant, in the course of his evidence-in-chief before the lower Court, retracted from the said Exhibits A and A1, thus prompting the lower Court into deciding that the entire evidence of the Appellant was at that stage unreliable and therefore discountenanced same; but the settled position of the law is that a retraction of a confession does not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible. See the old case of R. v. JOHN AGAGARIGA ITULE (1961) 1 ANLR 402 (FSC) where the Supreme Court per BRETT, Ag CJF held thus; “A confession does not become inadmissible merely because the accused person denies having made it and in this respect a confession contained in a statement made to the Police by a person under arrest is not to be treated different from any other confession. The fact that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial. See R v. SAPELE and ANOR (1952) 2 FSC 74 but it is not in itself a reason for ignoring the statement.” … It would be further recalled that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity when the statement was offered in evidence to deny having made it. But the position remains in law, that a mere denial without more, even at the earliest opportunity, cannot, on the bare facts of the case, lend any iota of weight to the denial. Apart from the fact that the denial is a bare statement bereft of any supporting facts, it is by and large, standing only on the ipsi dexit of the Appellant. To make matters rather worse and as revealed by the printed records in this case, the said statements were not even challenged on grounds of involuntariness and the learned trial Court in its Ruling on the objection raised by the Appellant rightly declined the invitation to conduct a trial within trial. Against this backdrop, the question of the voluntariness of the statements, not having been raised or challenged at the trial, this Court therefore holds that the prosecution proved affirmatively that Exhibits A and A1 were voluntary confessional statements of the Appellant. Regardless of this position, the usual thing in all criminal trials is that the burden of proving affirmatively beyond doubt that the confession was made voluntarily is always on the prosecution, which this prosecution succeeded in doing as expected in this case. See the cases of JOSHUA ADEKANBI v. A-G WESTERN NIGERIA (1961) All NLR 47; R v. MATON PRIESTLY (1966) 50 CR APP. R 183 at 188; ISIAKA AUTA v. THE STATE (1975) NNLR 60 at 65 SC on the issue.

— F.O. Oho, JCA. Nasiru v State (2016) – CA/S/78C/2015

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TEST TO PROVE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The tests for determining the voluntariness of a confessional statement have been consistently applied by this Court in a plethora of cases as follows: (1) Whether there is anything outside the confession to show that it is true. (2) Whether the statement is corroborated, no matter how slight (3) Whether the facts contained therein, so far as can be tested, are true. (4) Whether the accused person had the opportunity of committing the offence. (5) Whether the confession of the accused person was possible. (6) Whether the confession was consistent with other facts which have been ascertained and proved in the matter.

– J.I. Okoro JSC. Berende v. FRN (2021)

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FAILURE TO USE VIDEO RECORDING DURING RECORDING CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The use of the imperative word “shall” in the provision underscores its mandatory nature. The mischief sought to be curbed by the law includes such unsavory situations as where an alleged confession is extracted by torture and duress imposed on a defendant which led to the confession, to avoid miscarriage of justice and to reduce to the barest minimum the incidents of retractions and time consumed by trial within trial proceedings. Section 9(3) ACJL is a mandatory procedural law against infractions on the constitutional rights of a defendant as enshrined in Section 35(2) of the CFRN (as altered). Any purported confessional statement recorded in breach of the said provision is of no effect. It is impotent and worthless. See JOSEPH ZHIYA v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2016) LPELR – 40562 Pp. 28-29 Paras G-B, ISMAILA FATOKI v. THE STATE- unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1125/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, FABIAN MATHEW v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1126/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, KINGSLEY AKHABUE v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1056/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, AGBANIMU v. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43924 (CA) Pp. 11-12 Paras E-A, ENECHE v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2018) LPELR – 45826 (CA) Pp. 27-28 which are persuasive precedents of the Court of Appeal.

— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. Friday Charles v. The State of Lagos (SC.CR/503/2020, Friday March 31 2023)

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RETRACTION OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT DOES NOT RENDER IT INADMISSIBLE

It is trite that the mere retraction of a confessional statement by the Defendant will not render it inadmissible. It will only affect the weight to be attached to it where the Defendant denies making it at the earliest opportunity.

– Ogunwumiju JSC. Junaidu v. State (2021)

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