The composition of the Disciplinary Committee is intrinsic to the fulfilment of the requirements of Section 36 of the Constitution that guarantees fair hearing to the accused. Where the panel is constituted in such a way that it affects a person’s right to fair hearing, whatever decision is reached by such a panel will result in a nullity.
– Abdu Aboki JSC. Gbenoba v. LPDC (2021)
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There are certain basic criteria and attributes of fair hearing, some of which are relevant in this case. These include: (i) that the court shall hear both sides not only in the case but also in all material issues in the case before reaching a decision which may be prejudicial to any party in the case. See Sheldon v. Bromfield Justices (1964) 2 QB. 573, at p. 578. (ii) that the court or tribunal shall give equal treatment, opportunity and consideration to all concerned. See on this: Adigun v. A.-G., Oyo State and Ors. (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678. (iii) that the proceedings shall be held in public and all concerned shall have access to and be informed of such a place of public hearing and (iv) that having regard to all the circumstances, in every material decision in the case, justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to have been done: R. v. Sussex Justices, ex-parte McCarthy (1924) 1KB 256, at p. 259; Deduwa and Ors. v. Okorodudu (1976) 10 SC 329.
– Ejiwunmi JSC. Unibiz v. Lyonnais (2003)
The proceedings before the Disciplinary Investigation Panel in this case are vitiated from two angles. Firstly the Panel lacked the constitutional and legal competence to undertake the inquiry and arrive at a conclusion that the Appellants were the culprits in serious criminal offences of Arson, Malicious Damage and Indecent Assault. Secondly, the incompetent inquiry which it conducted was further vitiated by its failure to accord the appellants fair hearing either under the rules of natural justice or under the provisions of Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution.
– Oputa, J.S.C. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550
Now it has been held that the principle of or doctrine of fair hearing in its statutory and constitutional form is derived from the principle of natural justice under the twin pillars of audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. The principle of fair hearing is fundamental to the administration of justice as enshrined under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). It hinges on the conduct of a hearing which is fair to both parties to the suit and without bias or partiality in favour or against either of them who will thereby be prejudiced. See Ude v. State (2012) LPELR 14193 (CA); Uguru v. The State (2002) 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90; Newswatch Communications (CA) v. Attah (2006) 12 NWLR (Pt. 993) 144; Ovunwo v. Woko (2011) 6 SCNJ (Pt. 1) 124; Nosepetco Oil and Gas Ltd v. Olorunimbe (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1307) 115. In Egbuchu v. Continental Merchant Bank Plc (2016) NWLR (Pt. 1513) 192 at 207, the apex Court held inter alia that: “The Constitutional provision for fair hearing mainly stems or germinates from two common law principles of natural justice. They are audi alteram partem and nemo judex in causa sua. The meaning of the Latinism is, hear the other party; hear both sides. No man should be condemned unheard. What the rule or doctrine of fair hearing means is that the parties must be given equal opportunity to present their case to the Court and no party should be given more opportunity or advantage in the presentation of his case.” See also Inakoju v. Adeleke (2007) 4 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 423. The issue of fair hearing is so fundamental and germane that any proceeding conducted without fair hearing amounts to a nullity and is bound to be set aside. See Tsokwa Motors (Nig) Ltd v. UBA Plc (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1071) 347; Egbuchu v. Continental Merchant Bank Plc supra; Adigun v. Oyo State (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 678.
— S.C. Oseji, JCA. Access Bank v Edo State BIR (2018) – CA/B/333/2015
The apex court had stated the position of the law succinctly thus:- “Fair hearing lies in the procedure followed in the determination of the case and not in the correctness of the decision. It is synonymous with trial and implies that every reasonable and fair-minded observer who watches the proceedings should be able to come to the conclusion that the court has been fair to all the parties”. (Italics mine, for emphasis) Magna Maritime Services Ltd v. Oteju (2005) All FWLR (Pt. 270) 1995, (2005) LRCN Vol. 128 1497 at page 152; per Edozie JSC Kotoye v. C.B.N. (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 98) 419 at 444; State v. Onagoruwa (1992) 7 LRCN 194.
— Danjuma, JCA. Tony Anthony Nig. Ltd & Ors. v. NDIC (CA/L/630/2009 • 25 January 2011)
The court below at pages 289 to 291 of the record in its judgment examined the appellants’ complaint as to absence of fair hearing and said: “It must be noted that the court must balance its discretionary power to grant or refuse an adjournment with its duty to endeavour to give an appellant the opportunity of obtaining substantial justice in the sense of his appeal being granted a fair hearing or even in the court below. This is because of the need that in granting the hearing on the merits no injustice is done to the other party where that opportunity or fair hearing existed in the court below, the appellate court has no business interfering. See University of Lagos v. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 1) page 142; Ogundoyin v. Adeyemi (2001) 13 NWLR (pt. 730) 403 at 421. The very essence of fair hearing under Section 36 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 is a hearing which is fair to both parties to the suit; be they plaintiffs or defendants or prosecution or defence. The section does not contemplate a standard of justice which is biased in favour of one party and to the prejudice of the other. Rather, it imposes an ambidextrous standard of justice in which the court must be fair to both sides of the conflict. The hearing must be fair and in accordance with the twin pillars of justice, read as pillars of justice, namely audi alteran partem and nemo judex in causa sua per Onu J.S.C. at 421. See also Ndu v. State (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 164) 550. A party who will be affected by result of a Judicial inquiry must be given an opportunity of being heard, Otherwise, the action taken following the inquiry will be Unconstitutional and illegal. See Ogundijun v. Adeyemi (2001) 13 NWLR (Pt. 730) 403 at 423 per Onu J.S.C. See also Atande v. State (1988) 3 NWLR (pt. 85) 681. In the light of the above I have no difficulty in Resolving this issue of fair hearing or not against the Appellant. Therefore this appeal lacking in merit is hereby dismissed.” I agree with the views expressed by the court below above. I am unable to hold that the appellants were denied their right to fair hearing as enshrined in section 36 of the 1999 Constitution.
— A. Oguntade, JSC. Pam & Anor. V Mohammed (2008) – SC.238/2007
The law is indeed well settled that fair hearing within the meaning of Section 36(1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended), means a trial or hearing conducted according to all legal rules formulated to ensure that justice is done to the parties. It requires the observation or observance of the twin pillars of the rules of natural justice, namely audi alterem partem and nemo judex in causa sua. These rules, the obligation to hear the other side of a dispute or the right of a party in dispute to be heard, is so basic and fundamental a principle of our adjudicatory system in the determination of disputes that it cannot be compromised on any ground. See Per PETER-ODILI, JSC in EYE v. FRN (2018) LPELR-43599(SC) (P. 28-30, PARA. A).
— U.M. Abba Aji, JSC. State v. Andrew Yanga (SC.712/2018, 15 Jan 2021)
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