It is settled law that for the prosecution to discharge the burden of proof placed on it by law in a charge of causing death by dangerous driving under the provisions of sections 4 and 5 (1) of the Federal Highway Decree No. 4 of 1971, it must establish by evidence, the following ingredients of the offences: (a) that the accused person’s manner of driving was reckless or dangerous. (b) that the dangerous driving was the substantial cause of the death of the deceased; and (c) that the accident occurred on a Federal Highway -see State vs Usifor (1974) 1 NMLR 72. — W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC. Moses v State [2006] – S.C.308/2002
SOME PRINCIPLES GUIDING CONVICTION FOR DANGEROUS DRIVING
1. It is now settled that carelessness on the part of a driver no matter how slight, has been held to amount to dangerous driving. See R v. Evans (1963) 47 CAR 62 @ 64;
2. It has been held that momentary inattention, has been accepted to amount as a fault sufficient to constitute dangerous driving. See The State v. Felix Ibeneme (1965) 3 ENLR. 26.
3. In the case of Simpson Peat (1952) 2 QB 24. it was held that a driver might be convicted of dangerous driving, even though such driving were due to something which could be described as an error of judgment. See also The Attorney-General of Western Nigeria v. Salami Aiibola (1966) NMLR 204.
4. In the case of The State v. Stephen Eienabe (1976) (1) NMLR 135- Uwaifo, J. (as he then was), held that dangerous driving is proved, by the slightest negligence on the part of the driver so charged. That driving from one side of the road, to the other, amounts to driving to the danger of the public. See also Lewis v. Raglan Building Co. Ltd. (1941)3 All E.R. 332. Avo Richards v. Inspector General of Police (1959) LL.R 88 and TAie State v. Felix Ibeneme (supra).
5. In R. v. Graham Ball (1966) 50 CAR 266 0). 270. Parker, L.C.J., held that the phrase “driving in a manner dangerous to the public”, means the manner of the driving.
6. In Hill v. Bexter (1958) 43 CAR 42 @ 58, Lord Goddard, L.C.J, described dangerous driving (which resulted to manslaughter), as an offence of absolute prohibition into which no mens rea enters and that it is no answer to say, “I don’t mean to drive dangerously”.
7. To leave one’s lane for another when another vehicle is approaching from the opposite direction (as in the instant case leading to his appeal) and thereby causing one’s vehicle to hit that other in the process, has been held as dangerous driving. This is why, if a trial Judge, accepts the prosecution’s case that the accused person left his own side of the road, crossed over to the other side and collided with the vehicle of the other driver on his own side of the road, it is not necessary to make a finding on the exact point of impact. See Abdullahi v. The State (1985) 3 nwlr (Pt. 3) 523 @ 528 S.C. – the facts are similar to that in the present case/appeal.
8. The proof required to establish a case under Section 4 of the Federal Highway Act, 1971, is not as high as the one required to establish a case of manslaughter under the Criminal Code. See Abdullahi v. The State (supra) page 527.
9. A court, by virtue of Section 73 or now 74(1) of the Evidence Act, can take Judicial Notice of a Public Highway such as the Oke-Owa along Old Ondo-Benin Road in Ijebu-Ode. See Friday Onvekwere v. The State (1973) 5 S.C. 1 (8). 14. The State v. Usifoh (1974) (1) NMLR 72 (5> 77 and Adebodun Aiani v. The State (1978) 6 FCA 60.
— Ogbuagu, JSC. Moses v State [2006] – S.C.308/2002