MERE DEPOSIT OF TITLE DEEDS

EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CANNOT VARY A DEED

It was common ground that the relationship between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant is contractual and governed by exhibit B, the Deed of Legal Mortgage. That being so, extrinsic evidence will generally not be acceptable to vary the terms agreed upon (see for example U.B.N. v. Ozigi (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 333) 385). – Kutigi JSC. Okonkwo v. Cooperative Bank (2003)

A DEED BECOMES EFFECTIVE UPON DELIVERY

This is because, in my respectful view, it is settled that a transaction created by a deed will not come into effect prior to the delivery of the deed. In other words, a deed only becomes effective upon its delivery. So, until the time specified had arrived or the condition had been performed or the Governor has given his consent, the instrument, will not be a deed so to speak, but is a mere escrow.

– Ogbuagu, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)

DEED: DELIVERY OF A DEED IN LAW

It has to be stressed however that the term delivery, in law, is not synonymous with the physical exchange of signed and sealed documents between the parties thereto. It does not also mean the handling over of a document to the other side. It does mean and has been judicially interpreted to connote an act done so as to evince an intention to be bound. Even though the possession of such deed still remains with the maker, or his solicitor, he is bound by it if he has had it delivered in law by doing some unequivocal act whether by words or action evincing an intention to be bound. – Iguh JSC. Awojugbagbe v. Chinukwe (1995)

DEED: UNAMBIGUOUS OPERATIVE PART CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY THE RECITAL

I think Professor Kasunmu, S.A.N. counsel for the appellant was right when he submitted that the Court of Appeal relied on the recital to the deed to control the operative clause in Exhibit A. It is well settled that in interpreting a deed, an unambiguous operative part cannot be controlled by the recital. The clear and unambiguous operative part must be given full expression and effect. See I.R.C. v. Raphael (1935) A.C. 96,135 Dawes v. Tredwell (1881) 18 Ch. D. 354,388-9.

— Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Adebanjo v Olowosoga (1988) – SC 134/1986

BENEFIT OF EARLIER REGISTRATION IN DEED

It cannot be disputed that where two competing deeds are registered, each takes effect as against the other from the date of registration and the benefit of earlier registration is preserved.

– Iguh JSC. Kayode v. Odutola (2001)