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NATURE OF CONCURRENT FINDINGS

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There are thus concurrent findings of fact that the appellant was in breach of contract to fly the respondent from Lagos to Manzini and back to Lagos. It is very well settled that concurrent findings by the trial court and the court of Appeal would not be disturbed by the Supreme Court except there has been exceptional circumstances to disturb those findings such as: 1. The findings cannot be supported by evidence, or are perverse. 2. There is miscarriage of justice or violation of law or procedure.

– Rhodes-Vivour, JSC. Cameroon v. Otutuizu (2011) – SC.217/2004

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SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERFERE WILL CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS

We have to emphasize all over again that the Supreme Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of a trial court and the court of Appeal on issues of fact. The two courts are presumed to have considered all the facts necessary for their coming to such findings. The Supreme Court will only disturb or upturn a concurrent finding of fact of the two lower courts in exceptional circumstances like: – (1) Where violation of some principles of law or procedure exists, and such erroneous proposition cannot stand if not corrected; (2) Patently erroneous findings of fact which amount to a travesty of justice if not left uncorrected; (3) Where the findings of fact are erroneous or perverse.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Mini Lodge v. Ngei (2009) – SC.231/2006

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CONCURRENT FINDING AS TO IDENTIFICATION

It was the trial Court which has the advantage of seeing, watching and observing the PW.1 testify in the witness box that can exercise its discretion, upon evaluation of the evidence before it, to believe or disbelieve her. That liberty and privilege of believing the PW.1 and accepting her evidence on the identification of the Appellant with whom she struggled over her bag, in preference to any other evidence per contra were completely within the discretion of the trial Court. On this issue of the credibility of the PW.1 there are concurrent findings of the two Courts below. This Court, therefore has very limited, if any scope to interfere.

— E. Eko, JSC. Kekong v State (2017) – SC.884/2014

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ONLY IN EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES WILL DISCRETION OF TRIAL JUDGE BE REVERSED

It is a trite procedural tenet that the evaluation of evidence and ascription of probative value to such evidence are the exclusive preserve of the trial court which had the opportunity of hearing and assessing the testimony and conduct of the witnesses. It is unusual for an appellate court to disturb such findings of a trial court except where it is found to be perverse irrational or does not accord with common sense. See DARE VS FAGBAMILA (2009) 14 NWLR (PT 1160) 177; SULE VS HABU (2011) 7 NWLR (PT 1246) 339 and KARIBO VS GREND (1992) 3 NWLR (PT 230) 426.

— S.C. Oseji, JCA. ACB v Ajugwo (2011) – CA/E/66/2006

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WHEN THE SUPREME COURT WILL SET ASIDE A CONCURRENT DECISION OF A COURT

From the onset it must be emphasized that being a concurrent finding of fact by the two courts, this Court is very slow at intervening except where the Appellants succeed in showing to us that notwithstanding the fact of concurrence in the decisions of both courts, the finding is perverse or that the finding has violated some essential principle of law or procedure and that the violation is substantial enough to lead to miscarriage of justice. See Onowan v Isarhjen (1976) 9-10 SC 95, Fashanu v. Adekoya (1974) 1 ALL NLR (PT. 1) 35 and Onwuka v Ediala (1989) 1 NWLR (pt.96) 182 at 202. It is only if this is demonstrated that this court will interfere. See Abinabina v Enyimadu 12 WACA 171 at 173, Omoborinola II v Military Governor Ondo State (1998) 14 NWLR (pt 584) 89 at 107, U.A.C Nig. Ltd. v Fashoyiten (1998) 11 NWLR (pt.573) 199 at 185 and Chinwedu v Mbamah & Or (1980) 3-4 SC 31 at 75.

— M.D. Muhammad, JSC. Kubor v. Dickson (2012) – SC.369/2012

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POLICY OF THE COURT NOT TO INTERFERE IN CONCURRENT FINDINGS

From a long line of cases, it is clearly evident that it is the policy of this Court not to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two courts below. This policy is predicated on, and presupposes that, the court of first instance evaluated the evidence, exercised its right to believe or disbelieve witnesses, and then finally arrived at specific findings on the issues of fact arising from the pleadings and evidence as presented to the court for resolution. When that had been done and the Court of Appeal confirms the findings of the trial court, then an appellant is confronted with a rather uphill task. There again, such an appellant will be required to show either that the findings were perverse thus leading to an obvious miscarriage of justice or that there was a violation of some principle of law or procedure.

– Oputa JSC. OLUFOSOYE v. OLORUNFEMI (1989)

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SUPREME COURT WILL NOT INTERVENE IN CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF LOWER COURTS

My lords, the appellants have not shown that the concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and the lower court are perverse or unreasonable. Neither have they shown that any miscarriage of justice had been occasioned by the concurrent findings. The attitude of this court to concurrent findings of facts by the two lower courts is well settled. This court will only interfere with such concurrent findings when the appellants show special circumstances by establishing either that there was a miscarriage of justice, or a serious violation of some principles of substantive law or procedure, or that the findings are perverse, or that the findings do not flow from the evidence adduced by the parties. See Enang v. Adu (1981) 11 – 12 SC 25 at page 42, (1981) 5 SC 291; Lokoyi v. Olojo (1983) 8 SC 61 at page 73; Ojomu v. Ajao (1983) 9 SC 22 at page 53; Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 5 – 7 SC 42 at page 45; Akayepe v. Akayepe (2009) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1152) 217. The principle has been repeated and repeated times without numbers. Unfortunately, legal practitioners, obviously for their economic gains, keep encouraging litigants to approach this court with appeals repeating the same complaints over findings of facts by courts of first instance which had been duly affirmed by the intermediate court. I think there should be serious sanction for these vexatious frivolities.

— Eko JSC. Benjamin v Kalio (2017) – SC/207/2006

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