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TERMINATION OF SERVICE – MASTER & SERVANT

Dictum

The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There is also no doubt that the contract of master and servant is subject to both statutory and common law rules. By and large, the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the particular contract under review, he must pay damages for breach.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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EMPLOYMENT OF STATUTORY FLAVOUR CAN BE DETERMINED BY THE STATUTE ONLY

NEPA v. Ango it was held as follows:- “An employee of an employer with statutory flavour has no right to terminate his appointment at will because the employee does not hold the appointment at the pleasure of such an employer. To determine the appointment, the employer has a duty to comply with the conditions precedent laid down in the conditions of appointment failing which such termination will be held to be ineffectual and void.”

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BAD FAITH IS INCONSEQUENTIAL IN TERMINATION OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT

Both in his pleadings and evidence the plaintiff concentrated so much on his allegations of bad faith, hatred, malice etc; but all these are of no consequence in determining whether or not his contract of employment was lawfully terminated by the defendant, considering that no reason was given for the termination.

– Ogundare, JSC. Chukwumah v. SPDC (1993)

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EMPLOYMENT NOT GOVERNED BY STATUTE – EMPLOYEE CAN ONLY CLAIM DAMAGES

In BENIN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANY PLC. v. ESEALUKA (2013) LPELR-20159 (CA) held that: “…where the relationship is not governed by statute and there is infraction of the terms of employment and dismissal by the employer, such infraction is merely wrongful and not null and void. The employee can only claim damages for breach of contract and cannot claim arrears of salary and reinstatement. See Eze v. Spring Bank (2011) 12 SC Pt.1 Pg.173; Joseph Ifeta v. SPDC Nig. Ltd. (2006) 8 NWLR Pt.983 Pg.585.” Per OGUNWUMIJU, J.C.A. (Pp.32-33, Paras.B-F).

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EMPLOYMENT OF STATUTORY FLAVOUR – CREATION OF STATUTE

It is settled law that the character of an appointment is determined by the legal character of the contract of employment. Where the contract of appointment is determinable by the agreement of the parties, there is no question of the contract having a statutory flavour. It is immaterial that the other contracting party is a creation of a statute.

– Muhammad JCA. Osumah v. EBS (2004)

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AN EMPLOYMENT WHERE NATURAL JUSTICE IS BEEN EXCLUDED IS PURE MASTER AND SERVANT

Lord Wilberforce in the case of Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 2 All ER 1278 at 1294 said: “One may accept that if there are relationships in which all the requirements of the observance of rules of natural justice are excluded (and I do not wish to assume that this is inevitably so), these must be confined to what has been called “pure master and servant” case, which I take to mean cases in which there is no element of public employment.or service, no support by statute, nothing in the nature of an office or a status which is capable of protection. If any of these elements exist, then in my opinion, whatever the terminology used, and even though in some interpartes aspect the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedural requirements to be observed and failure to observe them may result in a dismissal being declared to be void.”

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REPUDIATION BY ONE PARTY DOES NOT TERMINATE THE CONTRACT EXCEPT WHERE ACCEPTED

In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (1949) AC. 356, 361 Viscount Simon L.C. said, “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side, and acceptance of the repudiation on the other.” The proposition is founded on the elementary principles of the formation and discharge of contractual obligations. Where there is a unilateral repudiation of a contract, this is treated as an officer by the guilty part to the innocent party of the termination of the contract. It is the acceptance of the officer by the innocent party which acts as a discharge of the contract. – See Hochster H v. De La Tour (1853) 2 F& B. 678; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460. It is then open to the innocent party to sue only for damages since by his acceptance of the repudiation the contract comes to an end. Hence where the innocent party refuses to accept the repudiation the contract remains in existence.

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