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THE WORD “MAY” SYNONYMOUS WITH “SHALL”

Dictum

In Ushie v. Agbalu (2013) JELR 51127 (CA), the court relied on: Iyoho v. Effiong where the Supreme Court per A. M. Mukthar, JSC (as she then was) said: “Although the word ‘may’ is used in the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it means permissible. ‘May’ in ‘Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 1000, has been defined inter alia as ‘loosely, is required to; shall; must…In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”

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WHERE WORDS ARE CLEAR NO INTERPRETATION IS NEEDED

It is settled law that where the words of a statute or Constitution are clear and unambiguous, they call for no interpretation, the duty of the court in such a circumstance being to apply the words as used by the legislature.

– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)

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INTERPRETATION SHOULD NOT DEFEAT THE ULTIMATE DESIGN OF THE STATUTE

It is now trite law that in the quest to interpret or construe the provisions of a statute or the Constitution, the Court or Tribunal must construe or interpret the statute or the Constitution in order to bring out plainly the real intention of the Lawmaker or the framers of the Constitution and thus enhance its purpose. The Court or Tribunal has a bounden duty to consider as a whole the entire provisions of the law or the Constitution involved. The Statute or the Constitution in question must not be construed in a manner that will do violence to the provisions being interpreted and must not be interpreted to defeat the ultimate design or purpose of the Constitution or statute that calls for interpretation.

– OLABISI IGE, JCA. Petroleum Resources v. SPDC (2021)

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MISCHIEF RULE IN INTERPRETATION

It is well settled that the object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used in the statute and to give effect to it. One of the most useful guides to interpretation is the mischief rule which considers the state of the law before the enactment, the defect which the legislation sets out to remedy or/and prevent, the remedy adopted by the legislature to cure the mischief and the true reason of the remedy. The duty of the court therefore is to adopt such interpretation that will enable the suppression of the mischief and to promote the remedy within the true intent of the legislation.

– Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Savannah v. Ajilo (1989)

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

In my view their power under the section is further circumscribed and limited by sub-section (2) of section 82. They can only invite members of the public when they want to gather facts for the purpose of enabling them make law or amend existing laws in respect of any matter within their legislative competence or as witnesses in a properly constituted inquiry under section 82(1)(b). Their power to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste is also limited to government departments, authorities, and functionaries.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

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DEFINITION OF “SECONDMENT”

The term secondment is mostly used in the public service which is not the case in the instant suit. That notwithstanding, the Black’s Law Dictionary at page 1555 defines ‘secondment’ as “a period of time that a worker spends away from his or her usual job”. The court in the case of ALHAJI HAMZA DALHATU v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, KATSINA STATE & ORS (2007) LPELR-8460(CA) also reckoned the meaning of secondment as used in the Public service rules when it stated that: “SECTION 6 – TRANSFERS AND SECONDMENT 02601 – TRANSFER is the permanent release of an officer from one service to another or from one class to another within the same service. SECONDEMENT means the temporary release of an officer to the service of another Government or Body for a specified period.” Per ARIWOOLA, J.C.A. (P.34, paras. A-B).

— Z.M. Bashir, J. Gbaraka v Zenith Securities & Anor. (2020) – NICN/PHC/45/2018

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BY INTERPRETATION ACT, SINGULAR MEANS PLURAL IN ANY LEGISLATION

Let me hasten to state that even if the phrase any person denotes singular, by Section 14 of the Interpretation Act, in construing enactments, words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular. See COKER v. ADETAYO (1996) 6 NWLR (PT 454) 258 at 266, UDEH v. THE STATE (1999) LPELR (3292) 1 at 16-17 and APGA v. OHAZULUIKE (2011) LPELR (9175) 1 at 24-25.

— U.A. Ogakwu, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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