It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.
— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013
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Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.
— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
Competent authorities or Government must justify derogation from the fundamental rights of citizens by showing facts suggesting that the act or policy complained of is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It must be shown that the derogation is in the interest of public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or that the policy or action is for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons as required by section 45 (1) (a) and (b) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).
– Tijjani Abubakar, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016
Nobody can be compelled to associate with other persons against his will. Our Constitution guarantees every citizen that freedom of choice. Accordingly any purported drafting of any person into an association against his will even if by operation of customary law is in conflict with the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Constitution, 1963 and is void.
– Karibe-Whyte JSC.Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989
Anyone whose “Chapter IV Rights” have been, are being or likely to be contravened has unfettered access to a High Court for redress “High Court” is defined in Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution (the 1979) Constitution had the same Provisions to mean “the Federal High Court” or “the High Court of a State”.
– Ngwuta JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
It is trite that it is only actions founded on a breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution that can be enforced under the Rules. The facts relied upon by an applicant must therefore disclose a breach of his fundamental right as the basis for his claim. Where the facts relied upon discloses a breach of the fundamental right of the Applicant as the basis of the claim, there exists a redress through the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure. Where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. See SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LIMITED v. ANIGBORO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 189; WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL v. AKINKUMI (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1091) 151; NWACHUKWU v. NWACHUKWU (2018) 17 NWLR (PT. 1648) 357.
— F.A. Ojo, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020
A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
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