The rule with respect to conducting a trial within a trial operates only in cases of questioning the voluntariness or otherwise of confessions. It does not operate where an accused person denies making the statement or retracts.
– Galadima, JSC. Kingsley v. State (2016)
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It is trite law that where a person makes a free and voluntary confessional statement which is direct and positive and is properly proved, a trial court can comfortably convict him even on such confessional statement alone, without necessarily looking for any corroborative evidence.
– Sanusi, JSC. Umaru Sunday v. FRN (2018) – SC.145/2013
In a plethora of decisions, this court has held that a confessional statement constitutes evidence against the maker alone and cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused unless the co-accused adopts it by word or conduct. The rationale for this is clear – noone can confess to a crime on behalf of another. See: Ajaegbo v. The State (2018) LPELR – 44531 (SC) @ 44 – 45 C – D; (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 484; Kasa v. The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 269 @ 288; Jimoh v. The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 105 @ 139. It is therefore an incorrect statement of the law to state that the court can rely on the extra-judicial confession of an accused against his co-accused, to ground a conviction against him so long as it incriminates him.
— Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Enobong v. The State (2022) – SC/CR/249/2020
Olalekan v. State (2001) LPELR-2561(SC) 4, 50-51, F-A, where Onu, J.S.C. held as follows: “This Court has held times without number that the statement of an accused is not inadmissible merely because it is taken down in a different language from the language of the person making it. See Queen v. Baba Haske (1961) 1 All NLR 330 at 333.” (Emphasis supplied).
At page 37, A-C of the same Report, Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. also stated as follows: “The general proposition is well settled that where an interpreter has been used in the recording of a statement, the statement is inadmissible unless the person who interpreted it is called as a witness as well as the person who wrote it down.”
Again, at pages 55-57 of the same Report, Uwaifo, J.S.C. made his findings in extension as follows: “I have read the reasons given by my learned brother Ogundare, J.S.C. for dismissing this appeal on 20 September, 2001. I wish however, to express my views briefly on whether Exhibit A was properly admitted at the trial. Sgt Linus Patricks (PW6) was the officer who recorded the statement of the appellant. The appellant spoke in Yoruba language and PW6, acting through an interpreter, Aremu Adeosun (PE3), recorded the statement in English language. That was how Exhibit A, the said statement, came into existence. Now, PW3 testified that he interpreted between PW6 and the Appellant. Thereafter, he read the statement as written in English language by interpreting it to the Appellant who agreed that it was correctly recorded. He said the Appellant thumb-printed Exhibit A and he, the interpreter, signed it, as did PW6, the recorder of the statement… At the trial Court, no objection was taken to the voluntariness of the statement, or any other objection at all… The objection now taken in this Court is that the statement (Exhibit A) is hearsay evidence… With the greatest respect, what I understand the authorities in this country to establish is that where an interpreter has been used in taking down a statement, both the person who wrote down the statement and the person who interpreted it must be called as witnesses. In the case of the person who recorded the statement, he would, of course, state in evidence the procedure he took in the process. That was done in the present case. As for the person who interpreted, he would need to be presented as a witness to testify that he interpreted. It is then open to the defence to cross-examine them… I am therefore satisfied that the prosecution called the necessary witnesses who gave sufficient evidence in the present case to make Exhibit A admissible… The objection that it was hearsay is not well founded and I overrule it.”
Where a confessional statement is denied or retracted by an accused as in the instant case. it is desirable to have corroborative evidence no matter how slight before convicting on it. The Courts are enjoined as a matter of duty to test the veracity or otherwise of such statement by comparing it with other facts and circumstances outside the statement, to see whether they support, confirm or correspond with it. In other words, the Court must scrutinize the statement to test its truthfulness or otherwise in line with other available evidence. See: KAZEEM VS STATE (2009) All FWLR (Pt.465) page 1749; EDHIGERE VS STATE (1996) 8 NWLR (Pt.464) page 1; ONOCHIE & 7 ORS. VS THE REPUBLIC (1966) 1 SCNLR 204; and QUEEN VS ITULE (1961) 2 SCNLR 183.
— S.D. Bage, JSC. State v Masiga (2017) – SC
I agree with the learned counsel for the Respondent that the Appellant’s counsel had really misunderstood the fundamental requirement in criminal trial. A trial within trial is required in law where the objection to admissibility of a statement is based on the ground that it was not made voluntarily. In that case there has to be a trial within trial to determine the question of voluntariness. It is only where this is proved by the prosecution that the statement is admitted in evidence.
– Galadima, JSC. Kingsley v. State (2016)
The learned trial judge having admitted that the prosecution still bears the burden to call evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant made a voluntary confession in a trial within trial, went ahead to shift the burden of proof to the Appellant (Defendant at the trial Court). Evidence of a video recording or the presence of a legal practitioner would have been conclusive proof that the confessional statement was obtained voluntarily. It makes it imperative in the circumstances, particularly in cases of armed robbery where a death sentence is the sanction on conviction, that confessional statements should be taken according to the provisions of the law. Even where the prosecution has ignored the provision of the law as sacrosanct as this, the trial judge should have brought it up suo motu. The judge cannot pick and choose which extant law to enforce.
— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. Friday Charles v. The State of Lagos (SC.CR/503/2020, Friday March 31 2023)
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