It is wrong and improper to treat the evidence given by a witness in a previous proceeding as one of truth in a subsequent or later proceeding, in which he has not given evidence. See Obawole & Anor. v. Coker (1994) 5 NWLR 416, Alade v. Aborishade (supra); Enang & Anor. V. Ukanem & Ors. (1962) 1 All.N.LR. 530, and Ariku v. Ajiwogbo (1962) 2 S.C.N.L.R 369.
— G.A. Oguntade, JSC. Tijani Dada v Jacob Bankole (2008) – S.C. 40/2003
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Witnesses have the duty to tell the police as much as they know of a crime at the earliest opportunity in order to be seen as witnesses of truth and a Court of law must be careful in accepting delayed evidence when no satisfactory explanation is given.
– Ogunwumiju JCA. Okeke v. State (2016)
Chief Williams submits that a ruling on admissibility of evidence is provisional as a trial Judge in his final judgment may still exclude evidence that has been admitted if he discovers it has been wrongly admitted. In my respectful view, that submission appears rather too wide. The two authorities cited by him as supporting it do not go as far. In NIPC v. Thompson Organisation (1969) 1 NMLR 99, it is evidence that goes to no issue but wrongly admitted that is held should be expunged when considering the verdict. In Jacker v. International Cable Co. Ltd. 5 TLR 13, another case cited by Chief Williams, it was held there that where matter has been improperly received in evidence in the court of trial, even when no objection has been there raised, it is the duty of the Court of Appeal to reject it and to decide the case on legal evidence. With profound respect to the learned Senior Advocate these two decisions which he cited in oral argument before us do not support the rather wide submission he has made. In my view where evidence is tendered and objected to and the trial Judge, after full arguments by counsel for the parties, admits or rejects same, he cannot later, when considering his judgment reverse himself without hearing the parties; he cannot sit on appeal over his own judgment. Where evidence which goes to no issue has been inadvertently admitted the trial Judge is under a duty to disregard it when considering his verdict. If he fails to do so, an appellate court will.
— Michael Ekundayo Ogundare, JSC. Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) – S.C. 250/1991
The main thrust of the appeal appears to be that if the original of the public document is lost or destroyed thereby rendering the making of a certified copy impracticable, it would be unjust not to admit other form of secondary evidence such as a photocopy of the original document. I share the plight of the appellant but it must be borne in mind that the duty of the court is to expound the law and not to expand it. It is not the function of the court to supply omissions in statutes and thereby embark on judicial legislation.
– Edozie, JSC. Araka v. Egbue (2003) – SC.167/1999
Saleh v. B.O.N. Ltd (2006) NWLR (Pt. 976) 316 at 326-327 thus: “A company is a juristic person and can only act through its agents or servants. Consequently, any agent or servant can give evidence to establish any transaction entered into by a juristic personality. Even where the official giving the evidence is not the one who actually took part in the transaction on behalf of the company. Such evidence is nonetheless relevant and admissible and will not be discountenanced or rejected as hearsay evidence…”
The argument of the claimants that to adopt UTAS will promote inefficiency and discrimination in the public service of Nigeria has not been shown by any evidence other than the submission of the learned senior counsel to the claimants. No matter how brilliantly crafted an address of counsel is, it neither constitutes, nor can it take the place of evidence. See APC v. Sheriff & ors [2023] LPELR-59953(SC). And a a bare statement from the Bar by a counsel has no force of legal evidence. See Maduabuchi Onwuta v. The State of Lagos [2022] LPELR-57962(SC).
— B.B. Kanyip, J. FG v. ASUU (2023) – NICN/ABJ/270/2022
As rightly submitted by learned counsel for both parties, there are settled principles, which guide the Court in determining whether to grant leave to adduce fresh or further evidence. They are, inter alia, as follows: (a) The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been, with reasonable diligence, obtained for use at the trial, or are matters which have occurred after judgment in the trial Court. (b) In respect of other evidence other than in (a) above, as for instance, in respect of an appeal from a judgment after a hearing on the merits, the Court will admit such fresh evidence only on special grounds. (c) The evidence should be such as if admitted, it would have an important, not necessarily crucial effect on the whole case; and (d) The evidence must be such as apparently credible in the sense that it is capable of being believed and it need not be incontrovertible. See: Asabaro vs Aruwaji (1974) 4 SC (Reprint) 87 @ 90 – 91: Akanbi vs Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) 118@ 137 – 138 H – B: Esangbedo vs The State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt.113) 57 @ 67 A-C.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Williams v Adold/Stamm (2007) – SC.404/2013
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